The Hindu : The trinity issues

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Friday, Nov 07, 2003

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The trinity issues

By M.R. Srinivasan

Relations between India and the U.S. need to be based on a sympathetic understanding of each other's concerns and not against the backdrop of international rules of conduct which are breached whenever necessary.

EVERY ONE in India associates the Trinity with Brahma, Vishnu and Maheshwara. In the Indo-U.S. diplomatic dialogue, however, trinity issues mean cooperation in civilian nuclear power, cooperation in civilian space research and export of dual use technology. When the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, met the U.S. President, George W. Bush, in New York in September 2003 there was expectation that an agreement between the U.S. and India on these three issues would be announced. When no such announcement came, it was explained by some diplomats that the U.S. wanted to delay the agreement because it expected that Pakistan would make a case for similar treatment. After Pokhran I in 1974, the U.S. and Canada embargoed export of equipment, components and materials that could be used for nuclear applications. In 1978, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, at the initiative of the then President, Jimmy Carter. Parallel with this, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, popularly known as the London Club, was set up at the urging of the U.S. with the aim of denying to those outside the NPT supplies or knowhow related to nuclear technology. Some of the European countries and Japan were initially reluctant to go along this path but eventually accepted the U.S. dictates. In due course, the U.S. sponsored the Missile Technology Control Regime and embargoed equipment and technology related to space research to countries like India. Later, all these control regimes were unified under the `Energy' and `Wassenar' protocols.

While other countries have been affected by these technology denial schemes, India has been hurt the most because of its large and diversified nuclear and space programmes. Strangely, China, which in the past was classified as an enemy by the U.S., and even now is sometimes referred to as a potential challenger to U.S. hegemony, has access to nuclear and space technologies from the U.S. and other advanced countries. The justification is that it is a member of the NPT, though as a nuclear power, and also adheres to the MTCR. In reality, however, China assisted Pakistan actively in the latter's quest towards nuclear weapons, in violation of its obligations under the NPT. China also supplied long-range missiles and technology to Pakistan and North Korea, the latter also a supplier to Pakistan.

After the Pokhran II tests of 1998 and the Chagai tests in Pakistan in the same period, the U.S. put in place stricter embargoes against both India and Pakistan. Even prior to 1998, the U.S. authorities had drawn up an Entities List, running into a few hundreds, which included all industries, academic institutions and other bodies that carried out work for the nuclear or space programme. Any proposal by them to import a high technology item from the West or Japan resulted in a long correspondence with no certainty that the item would be cleared for export. The post-1998 embargoes reached ridiculous proportions; for instance, the author of this article could not get a visa to visit the U.S. in 2002 to attend a conference on a nuclear weapons-free world. While these embargoes were a nuisance to our scientists and technologists, they have hardly impeded India's nuclear and space programmes; in fact, the 1998-2003 period has seen many new achievements in these two advanced technology areas. If the U.S. is prepared to look at this irritant to find a way out, it is as much to do with improving relations with India as an admission that the embargo policies have failed, at least in the case of India.

What are the prospects of cooperation with the U.S. in the field of civilian nuclear power? The U.S has about 100 nuclear power units of the light water type in operation. However, in the last 15 years, the U.S. has not built a single new reactor and hence the industry has been virtually dismantled. Under the second Bush administration, there is talk of a revival of nuclear power in the U.S. However, the U.S is looking at designs using the High Temperature Gas Cooled system. India is presently building Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors, a type the U.S. has not been engaged in. India is building two light water reactors of Russian design at Koodankulam. India would like to build some more LWRs at Koodankulam and elsewhere. Some 15 or 20 years ago, France was very keen on building LWRs in India. Recent cost projections show that if an LWR were to be imported from France, the cost of electricity would be too high for the Indian consumer. This is because of the high capital cost of French supplied equipment. The massive devaluation of the Indian rupee in the 1990s is no doubt an important reason. The only way a French reactor would be competitive in India is if a large part of the equipment is made in India, on the basis of technology transfer. In comparison, Russia has offered prices that permit the reactor to supply power at acceptable cost. Even in this instance, if a further four or eight reactors were to be obtained from Russia, Indian industry must be brought in to make as much of the equipment as possible in India. The fact of the matter is that India is one of the most competitive producers of high technology equipment. This is the reason why our nuclear reactors, space satellites and launch vehicles are associated with low costs. To revert to the prospects of the U.S. supplying civilian nuclear power units to India, it is not building at present the type of reactors we are interested in; the ones it is considering in the revival of nuclear power are the types we have no immediate interest in. In addition, the cost disadvantage mentioned for the French reactor would apply to the U.S. reactors too. Moreover, after the long and protracted debate over Tarapur, many Indian policy makers would be weary of any future nuclear cooperation with the U.S.

Some U.S. commentators talk about cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety. With over 100 reactors operating over many years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has built up a formidable library of safety related issues, modes of equipment malfunction and the required operator intervention. If Indian safety regulators have access to this information it would be very useful indeed.

Regarding cooperation in civilian space activities, India already has its own programme of building satellites and launch vehicles. Even the unmanned moon mission is on the basis of home grown technology. If the U.S. were to ease restrictions on export, India might procure from the U.S. detectors, instruments, computers, power packs, electronics, etc. mounted on space platforms. A big inhibition, however, is that a future misunderstanding between India and the U.S. might throw the supplies into uncertainty. Some commentators have speculated that resolution of the trinity issues may open up a multi-billion dollar trade between the U.S. and India. There is indeed no objective basis for this expectation. At best there will be some trade but the gain is that an irritant embedded in the flesh will have been removed. Indian policy makers keep reminding that the U.S. has derived and continues to derive substantial benefit from Indian brains working in many areas of science and technology, space research, nuclear safety, software, health and medical services and so forth. To deny India the benefit of advances in S&T taking place in the U.S. therefore appears unethical. The U.S. invokes exceptionalism when dealing with countries such as China, Pakistan and Israel and yet hectors India that it has to live within the confines of U.S. laws and agreements. This is hardly the way to advance a relationship that is sometimes described as strategic.

One initiative the U.S. could take to improve relations in high technology with India is not to block high technology exports to India from other countries. Specifically, Russia is keen on supplying more light water reactors to India. But the U.S. is coming in the way, behind the scenes, reminding Russia of its obligations under the `Energy' regime. Even before the Indo-Russian supplementary agreement on Koodankulam was signed in 1998, the U.S. exerted pressure on Russia not to proceed with the project. Russia went ahead all the same on the ground that this was an agreement originally signed in 1988 which was simply being renewed. Similarly, the U.S. put pressure on Russia to renege on its contract to supply cryogenic engines to the Indian space programme. The U.S. did succeed in getting the technology transfer part of the agreement deleted. France expresses interest to cooperate with India on civilian nuclear power, from time to time. But after discussions proceed up to a point, they say that the U.S. has to agree to such cooperation. This is a clear case of double standards that the U.S. policy supports notwithstanding any claim to the contrary. Relations between the two largest democracies of the world need to be based on a sympathetic understanding of each other's concerns and not against the backdrop of international rules of conduct which are breached whenever necessary.

(The writer is a former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.)

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