|
Business
Pilot training and accidents in the Indian Air Force
THE LONG running debate over the IAF's proposed purchase of advanced jet trainers (AJTs) poses more than a few interesting questions that are rarely asked, leave alone answered, at least in public, so here goes...
First, a brief history. In the early 1980s, the IAF decided that it was facing unacceptably high levels of losses of both aircraft and fighter pilots and set up a committee under Air Marshal La Fontaine to study the problem. The committee submitted its report in 1984 saying that the accidents were a result of young pilots having to "convert onto'' high performance MiG-21 fighters straight from basic jet training on the HAL Kiran or the PZL Iskra. The committee went on to recommend that the solution lay with introducing an advanced jet trainer to bridge the gap between the two stages.
The AJT saga has since become almost mystical with imminent acquisition, regardless of price, stories alternating with accusations of corruption and "offers'' of alternates to the front-running British aircraft, the Hawk, ranging from the Franco-German Alphajet to the Russian MiG-AT. By all accounts, the Hawk is an excellent aircraft, but no aircraft is a magic bullet that can single-handedly transform pilot training and the AJT's acquisition could divert attention from perhaps more important criteria such as pilot selection, training standards, maintenance and so on.
Acquisition of the 66 Hawks reportedly required by the IAF will cost over Rs. 9,100 crores assuming that all of them are bought on the same terms that the NATO flying training school in Canada acquired them in 1999. This is the initial acquisition cost alone, with total maintenance costs over the lifetime of the aircraft being at least twice as great. Incidentally, the aircraft purchase is likely to be spread out over a few years, but in a peak year the outflow on this count may exceed 5 per cent of the total annual defence budget!!
Before getting into advanced fighter training, it is worth reviewing the IAF's current pilot training structure, concentrating on fighter pilots. Officer cadet training in the IAF is concentrated at the Air Force Academy, Dundigal (near Hyderabad), except for engineers, who train at Jalahalli, near Bangalore, and doctors, who attend the Armed Forces Medical College in Pune. Those expected to be inducted in to the IAF after three years at the National Defence Academy spend a year at Dundigal, whereas "Direct Entry'' officer cadets (who already have a university degree) train for a longer period.
Ground training at Dundigal in subjects ranging from aerodynamics, propulsion and navigation to meteorology is followed by, and concurrent to, primary flying training on the Deepak piston engined trainer made by HAL, Kanpur. Those successfully passing through this screening stage transit to the Kiran or the Polish Iskra jet trainers with the "Kiran stream'' moving onto armament training on the Kiran II. Some of this training is also conducted at the nearby Bidar and Hakimpet air bases. Successful completion of this basic training stage does not automatically lead to further fighter pilot training as the IAF also needs good transport and helicopter pilots and navigators, but the largest group heads for Tezpur, in Assam, and MOFTU, the MiG Operational Flying Training Unit, where they train on two-seat MiG-21s. Passing out of MOFTU means that the young officer finally becomes a fighter pilot who stays with the 21s or moves onto other fighters. The typical IAF fighter pilot goes on to "type qualify'' on more than one aircraft.
The statistics
Accident, or loss, rates of combat aircraft are usually measured in terms of incidents per ten thousand operational hours or "sorties.'' These are often not publicly disclosed and the IAF is no exception in this regard. However, the IAF with 26 aircraft lost in 2000 and 30 the year before is easily at the top of the accident league of large air forces and one can safely assume that measurements in terms of operational hours or sorties will not significantly affect its "record.''
Eighteen of the 26 aircraft lost in the year 2000 were fighters with the others ranging from helicopters to trainers like the Kiran and Iskra. Not all the 26 aircraft losses were fatal to the pilots concerned, but some were and the loss of civilian life and property on the ground was not insignificant.
Of the 18 fighters lost, ten were MiG-21s, prima facie a high level. Closer examination, however, reveals that only two were in Assam (or elsewhere in the North East). If one assumes that student pilots of MOFTU caused both, two out of 18, leave alone two out of 26, is a very low proportion hardly justifying hysteria on this count. Even this low figure might well be an over statement because a significant amount of MiG-21 operational flying takes place in north eastern India and the lost aircraft could well have been on those sorties.
The real reasons
Other reasons for losing the aircraft could range from bad weather to ageing aircraft and parts shortages leading to engine and structural failures. The morale of the IAF's engineering officers, and therefore of maintenance, reached a nadir during the Sareen era of the 1990s and one hopes that the small reduction in aircraft losses seen recently is a reflection of improvements effected following the extreme foolishness of that period.
If one goes back further in time, however, one discovers that the IAF used to have an excellent safety record - comparable to the best in the world. What has changed? Why have fighter pilot standards fallen so precipitously?
One can "buy'' the absence of an advanced trainer argument only if all the crashes were solely a result of errors at MOFTU by inexperienced pilot officers, but that falls flat on its face if the accidents involved pilots who had qualified from Tezpur and even more so if it involves flying officers, flight lieutenants and squadron leaders, and a large proportion do.
The obvious question that needs to be asked is if pilot selection and training has been compromised so far that those who ought never have been allowed to have been selected for further training, leave alone qualified as fighter pilots, have been let loose to cause mayhem in the sky and on the ground. Introduction of an advanced trainer should not be used to compensate for gross inadequacies in selection or training - it never can.
Mr. Fernandes should not allow himself to be led up the garden path with regard to the AJT. It is not only a matter of the tens of thousands of crores that the Hawks will cost over their lifetimes - only the best pilots contribute to national defence, while the others may end up costing it dearly for years to come.
C. Manmohan Reddy
Send this article to Friends by
E-Mail
Business
|
