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Literary Review
Soldiers speak
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While in Musharraf's War experts look back on the implications of Kargil, The 1971 Indo-Pak War is more an account of political issues concerning East Pakistan, says Lt. Gen. A.M. VOHRA.
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OCCUPATION of heights across the LOC in the Kargil sector in 1999 and thus move the LOC forward, interdict Srinagar-Kargil-Leh road with greater effect and internationalise the Kashmir issue by creating a scare of a nuclear flash point; these led General Musharraf to launch operation "Badr" in the spring of 1999 which can rightly be called Musharraf's war. This book, however, also gives a resume of three previous wars between India and Pakistan, the 1947-48 attempt to grab Jammu and Kashmir, the 1965 and the 1971 wars. This was perhaps not necessary and, in any case, how can one do justice to such a review in 49 pages? The author has raised a number of issues and expressed what are at best personal views, without any empirical evidence; matters like the role of the few senior British officers that still served in the Indian Army, the availability of forces to go beyond URI (The official history of 1947-48 war does not think so) and the failure of General Cariappa and Thimayya to recapture Skardu.
Leaving aside the genesis of the Kargil intrusion — whether it was initially planned to be executed in 1984 as the author believes or was first considered by Zia-ul-Haq at a cabinet meeting in 1987 and set aside — Musharraf was certainly going ahead with all the measures to implement the plan at the time of the meeting of the Prime Ministers at Lahore early in 1999 where peace and reconciliation were the issues. The author suggests that Pakistan went ahead with its intrusions, in the belief that its recently proclaimed nuclear weapon status would prevent India from starting a conventional war. For good reasons India restricted its response to getting the intrusions vacated and did not wish to enlarge the scope of hostilities, but its response was strong, deliberate and well planned. Colonel Ludra, the author of the chapter "Operations in Kargil", spells this out. The chief of the army staff, General Malik, assessed the situation and laid out his priorities and methodology. "The use of air power by India put Pakistan totally off-balance", as brought out in the subsequent chapter of the book.
Air Marshal Bedi's "The IAF in Kargil — The Inside Story" is a valuable contribution to understanding the circumstances and the constraints under which the air force operated and why the application of air power in its classical sense stood precluded. While agreeing with his observation that it is normal in India to keep the service chiefs out of the decision-making process at the top level, as is reported to have been the case while deciding not to cross the LOC, it must be stated that this decision won international approbation. The lesson of course is that the chiefs need to be more assertive and the politico-bureaucratic conglomeration more understanding. The discussion in regard to the crossing of the LOC should have been taken with the chiefs present and after taking their views into consideration.
The Air Marshal has also explained the circumstances that brought in the IAF into the battle only on May 26, after two crucial weeks had been lost. The lessons to be learnt here have been spelt out and no doubt noted by service headquarters concerned.
Apropos Major General Rajinder Nath's chapter "Macro Level Aspects of Kargil War", we are fortunate that the Kargil Review Committee report has done a thorough job of the work entrusted to it. Some recommendations in regard to modernisation of equipment and force multipliers have been already implemented, e.g. night vision devices based on thermal imaging, battle field surveillance radar of medium and short range and high altitude U.A.Vs have been introduced. Major General Rajindar Nath's point regarding the amalgamation of the paramilitary forces and a review of their arms as well as training needs early implementation.
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ALMOST half of The 1971 Indo-Pak War deals with the political situation in East Pakistan in August 1970, when the author took over command of 26 Battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment (26 FF) located at Saidpur. On seeing the plight of the populace, he observes, "for them independence has changed nothing, only the master". He notices that a Bengali translation of Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare was being sold on the footpath of the main cities. After the indefinite postponement of the inaugural session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held on March 3, 1971, the murder of army personnel, (from West Pakistan) caught in ones and twos became an everyday occurrence. "We were slowly but definitely losing our credibility". Civil disobedience movement gained momentum. "Bengali officers and men of Pakistan Army resented, restricted and later prohibited the passage of West Pakistani troops. Higher Command was earnestly trying to bring political parties to a negotiated solution". Why, he asks, could not Bhutto and Mujib narrow the gap between the "six point programme of Mujib and "two majority parties in one country' (udhar tum idhar hum) of Bhutto. "Obviously the proximity of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to the seat of power ... ... point to a deliberate and well though out position."
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman launched civil disobedience. Martial law was invoked. Major (later Major General and President of Bangladesh) Ziaur Rehman made a declaration of independence on Chittagong Radio on March 27, 1971 on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Disarming of the East Bengal Regiment and EPR was ordered and massacre took place of West Pakistani troops at Pabna and Kushtia. The author observes that, "To expect a Bengali in uniform not to have been affected by the aspirations of his people and to remain indifferent to the blood of his kinsman flowing as a result of military action was to ignore human nature." Yet, he had to disarm 3 EBR by military action by his battalion, 26 FFR. This "internal" strife among the forces in East Pakistan "squeezed" the Pakistan army into the cantonments under their control with others held by EBR, EPR and "Ansars". Several chapters are devoted to the attack and recapture of these towns from them and the reassertion of the state power by June 1971.
In the Preface, the author sets out his two-fold purpose in writing this book. Firstly, to record the deeds of his battalion, 26 FF, and secondly, to leave for the young and the middle rank officers of today and tomorrow a legacy of his battle experience.
On December 3, 1971 Pakistan declared war in the belief that with a major portion of Indian forces so inextricably involved in East Pakistan, the situation in West Pakistan presented an opportunity. He outlines the Pakistani perception to defend the Eastern Wing by fighting along the borders to defend every inch of territory. In this context, he states that the assumptions on which Pakistan based its plans, had gone for a six and that it was essential to modify the defensive strategy. "Our lack of foresight and failure to reset to new operational realities meant that at no stage during the battle for East Pakistan did we withdraw to an inner triangle and we did not `defend Dhaka at all cost' as planned. In fact, we appear to have disintegrated as a cohesive fighting force somewhere between the borders and our envisaged first, or in some cases second, line of defence... we lost the war without loosing a battle."
On December 15, 1971, the defences of the Brigade of which 26 FF was a part, were readjusted; Dinajpur was abandoned to reduce the brigade's extended frontage. On December 16, orders were received that arrangements to end hostilities have been worked out; units should contact Indian counterparts by raising white flags and lay down arms. To the Commanding Officer of 26 FF this was beyond comprehension. However, the battalion surrendered, laid down its arms and were moved to a POW camp. On December 21, they were moved into India by buses.
Life in POW camps in Ranchi is described. An aspect that is worth mentioning is what the author calls "crude attempt at mass indoctrination" the response to which was "full of contempt and dislike". Some of his musings while he was a POW are at variance with his observations. A notable one relates to Bhutto. As quoted earlier, he bemoans Bhutto's reasoning of two majority parties, "Udhar tum, Idhar hum" and points out that Bhutto's proximity to the seat of power led to a deliberate and well thought out position. He also opines that "without assigning him the role of the architect of the Martial law policies, his conduct cannot be explained". In his musings he refers to Bhutto as a leader of consequence and praises his performance at the Security Council and his resignation at Tashkent. The author's own observations about the plight of the people of East Pakistan and his sympathy for their aspirations all go by the board. If there is one person responsible for the break up of Pakistan, it was Bhutto.
The author raises the question whether the course of insurgency adopted by Mujib's Awami League was "a strategy to attain independence or was it something imposed on the people of East Pakistan?" He draws attention to Sheikh Mujib's "illuminating responses" and states that these were of a majority party leader and not a secessionist.
The book is more an account of political issues concerning East Pakistan and not so much of a book on the 1971 war. The observations on the war are limited primarily to the action of 26 FF, the author's command.
Musharraf's War, edited by Maj. Gen. Rajindar Nath, Lancer Books, 2003, p.298, Rs.580.
The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p.325, Rs. 475.
Lt. Gen. A.M. Vohra was the Vice Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army.
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