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Role of inter-governmental agencies
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Both the NDC and the ISC have proved to be necessary and integral parts of the Indian federal structure. A few reforms can go a long way in making them more functional and relevant.
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UNION-STATE relations in India have enlarged into an extended network of organisations and agencies. One important feature of this structural growth is that they have mostly developed outside the framework of the Constitution, or they were barely mentioned therein or came to be subsequently referred to in passing. For instance, the Inter-State Council (ISC) was provided for in the Constitution right from the beginning but it was first set up in 1990. A surrogate Inter-State Council was, however, set up by the Nehru Government in 1952 in the National Development Council (NDC) for Union-State clearance of Five Year Plans and to look into related issues of economic development in the country.
The forums and agencies that really make the Indian federation tick can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) Inter-governmental agencies, e.g. NDC, ISC, and ministerial and secretaries level meetings; (2) federal agencies having implications for the States as well. For example the Planning Commission, the Finance Commission, a number of independent regulatory authorities in sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), etc.; (3) inter-State conferences of Chief Ministers, either all of them or those from one particular or political persuasion. A Chief Ministers' conference excluding the federal government all together has probably never met. Regional or zonal meetings of Chief Ministers have, of course, been frequent events. Moreover, India has a forum in the National Integration Council (NIC) created by Nehru in the backdrop of the Chinese aggression in 1962 that goes beyond the inter-governmental scope and adds on to it non-governmental agencies like newspaper editors, Vice-Chancellors and important personalities from all walks of life.
A unique forum
The NDC serves and with certain reforms can serve even better as a useful instrument of inter-governmental relations. It is a unique forum, which brings together the executive heads of the two orders of government in the country of subcontinental plural and federal diversities. Instead of establishing it under Article 263 of the Constitution or under a parliamentary statute, it was set up by a Cabinet resolution. Despite its lacking in constitutional status, it has been more functional than the ISC.
Since 1952 till date, it has met 49 times. During 37 years of Congress dominance and Janata Party phase, the NDC had 40 meetings with an average of 1.1 per year. In 11 years of multi-party coalition/minority governments since Nov-Dec 1989, it had nine meetings with an average of 0.8 meetings per year. It may appear paradoxical that the frequency of meetings has declined between the two phases in terms of average. One would have expected a greater frequency during the later phase given the greater federalisation of the Indian polity as indicated by a more differentiated set of parties ruling at the Union and in the States since 1989. This anomaly can however be explained by referring to two factors. First, coalition and minority governments have been very unstable resulting in delays in launching of the plans. Second, different sets of parties including the regional ones ruling in the States have been partners in this federal coalition governments. This has allowed them direct access and opportunity for representation of their views in the Union Cabinet. Therefore, they have not been very keen and insistent on the activation of the NDC as an inter-governmental forum.
Special status
There is another point of view that maintains that the NDC has been meeting whenever there is an issue of importance. Apologists of this point of view also argue that the NDC doesn't lose anything by not having a constitutional or statutory status. They argue that it is directly under the Prime Minister who is its chairman. It is thus under the highest political executive in the country, which lends to it a special status in the government. But this argument appears to be partly valid. Lacking a constitutional status, plans can be/are launched without the stamp of its approval and its meetings are not held for years. For instance, the Ninth Plan proposal prepared by the Planning Commission in 1997 was belatedly approved by the NDC only in 1999 after a delay of two years.
However, one thing that can be said unquestionably about the NDC is that it has not been as idle and inconsequential as the ISC appears to be. Its agenda has been often rather crowded with crucial issues of inter-governmental significance. Planning related issues have naturally been its most important preoccupation — 67 items out of a total 151 discussed since 1952 to September 2001. Other agenda issues in descending order of frequency counts for the same period are as follows: food, agriculture, power, irrigation and related issues 19, rural development and related issues 14, social sector (including health, employment and education) 13, Centrally sponsored schemes 6, land reforms 5, and miscellaneous 16. So the major credit for initiation of development policies and dynamics of Union-State relations must be attributed to the NDC. However, the frequency and procedures of the NDC meetings, the process of plan formulation and implementation leave much room for reforms.
A survey of the meetings of the ISC shows that over this decade, there were only seven meetings of the Council which would appear rather surprising in view of the fact that this period has been one in which paradigm shift in Union-States relations took place. The issues discussed in these meetings under various governments are fairly common: recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission Report covering the entire gamut of Union-State relations, Article 356, inter-State river water disputes, greater autonomy to States, Centrally sponsored schemes, devolution of financial powers to the States and Panchayati Raj, Governor's role, consideration of State legislation reserved by Governors for the Presidential assent, resource mobilisation, etc. However, there has hardly been any constitutional amendment or parliamentary enactment in pursuance of recommendations made by the ISC. In fact, on most crucial issues, any substantial consensus in the Council has been conspicuous by its absence. The discussions on Article 356 and the role of the Governor clearly illustrate this point.
This monumental failure of the ISC to emerge as an active inter-governmental forum in the Indian federal system needs explanation. The reasons must be discussed in terms of two phases: (1) The first four decades of Indian federation during which the ISC was not formally set up, and (2) the period since its inception in the 1990s. During the first phase of Congress dominance at the Centre as well as in most States, the Congress Working Committee and the Congress Parliamentary Board not only eclipsed the NDC but also atrophied the necessity for setting up the ISC. Moreover, economic planning which was a complex issue necessitated the creation of the NDC for approval of plans by the two orders of the government. Nehru set up the NDC by executive fiat presumably to make it more amenable for the Union to manage inter-governmental affairs in its own way without the constraints of a constitutional body. The successive governments also continued this tradition and practice discussed above. Moreover, the Sarkaria Commission, though it recommended the setting up of the ISC under Article 263, reduced its importance by suggesting the continuation of the NDC as a separate inter-governmental agency with constitutional entrenchment. The continued existence of two separate bodies has meant an active NDC in the more salient area of economic federalism and the eclipse of ISC in the political domain. Its importance has been reduced further with the formation of minority/coalition governments in the post-1989 phase because the regional parties have direct access in the cabinet coalition so the need for a separate forum was not greatly felt. Yet one should not write the ISC off. For its relevance as an inter-governmental forum with certain reforms is unquestionable.
Structural reform
To sum up, both the NDC and the ISC have proved to be necessary and integral parts of the Indian federal structure. Their utility is established beyond doubt. A few reforms can go a long way in making them more functional and relevant. These bodies can be made more open and participative by providing for conference-eve consultation and representation with affected interests and organisations in the civil society. Besides procedural reforms, like holding regular and preferably in-camera meetings with advanced agenda, preparatory groundwork and flexible and consensual rules of business, the most important structural reform that can be suggested is the NDC's entrenchment in the Constitution and the merger of the NDC and the ISC as the key apex inter-governmental agency.
In my well-considered opinion, this merger will have two desirable effects. First, it would avoid unnecessary bifurcation of the apex inter-governmental body with the same membership in the NDC and the ISC. The division of work between the two in terms of economic and political policy-making is apparently made on the reasoning that it would prevent politicisation of the planning process. In any case, politics cannot really be separated from economic decision-making. In fact, a certain degree of political contestation is necessary to inject a dose of democratic bargaining to remove the distortions of an imposed consensus that may really conceal an unjust political order. Secondly, this artificial separation also results in narrow construction of policy areas not only along economic and political issues but also in the proliferation of a very large number of national councils for a variety of policy areas that lack integrated high power status to lend weight to their recommendations. These national councils may still be continued as bodies of technocrats whose recommendations must be considered by a top-level inter-governmental agency representing the executive heads of the two orders of government. Moreover, there is no constitutional obstacle to the merger of the NDC and the ISC, as Article 263 of the Constitution doesn't really restrict the functions of the ISC to any specific limitation in terms of economic or political decision-making. The division of work between the two is made only in the Cabinet resolution setting up the NDC.
REKHA SAXENA
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