Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Iraq: to invade or not

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

There is some speculation whether the fact that Saddam Hussein is an unfinished business of the previous Bush administration has anything to do with all this.

THERE ARE many debates going on in this great country — about the crookedness of chief executives of gigantic corporations who have milked their companies of billions of dollars and reduced the hard earned savings of their employees and ordinary investors to worth less than the paper on which the stocks are printed, about social security, about the state of the economy, about the spate of child kidnappings resulting in most cases in murder of little girls of 5 to 7 years age, and so on. For the rest of the world, however, the debate that has been raging for the past weeks over the projected invasion of Iraq is of particular relevance and importance.

A report in The New York Times a few days ago, based on a classified document which the daily claimed was in its possession, informed the world that a proposal to launch an invasion of Iraq with the stated objective of overthrowing its President, Saddam Hussein, was in an advanced stage of discussion in the administration. A massive force of 250,000 troops, with appropriate air and naval support, would be deployed to rid Iraqis of their hated leader and the region of a serious menace to peace and stability that is posed by his ambitions of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The clinching argument for the invasion and for rallying public opinion at home and internationally is that the action would be part of the ongoing global war on terrorism since Mr. Hussein's Iraq has links with Al-Qaeda. No decisions have yet been taken, one is told. The Government is acutely conscious of the risks and costs involved, in human and material terms, as also in terms of the damage to the "coalition" that has been so effortlessly set up since 9/11. In fact, the original coalition of 1991 to fight the Gulf War which is technically still in existence, might get broken up. The almost certain alienation of the Arab and Muslim world is very much in the minds of those planning the invasion. According to published reports, senior levels in the joint chiefs of staffs have serious reservations about the proposal.

To inform the American people of all the complex issues involved, as he put it, so that they could take, through the Congress, a logical and suitable decision, Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, convened public hearings on July 31 and August 1. Experts from various fields, including Richard Butler, former leader of the United Nations weapons inspection regime in Iraq called UNSCOM, other well known names from think-tanks as well as one former Republican Secretary of Defence and one former Democrat National Security Adviser, appeared before the Committee and gave the American people the benefit of their experience and wisdom. This is a very useful instrument to take the people into some kind of confidence, something we in India should consider adopting. The hearings were televised live.

All kinds of questions were gone into: is Mr. Hussein really a threat? What is the status of his ambition of acquiring WMD? What about his support to terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists? Does he have links with Al-Qaeda? What will or should replace him? What would it take to `take him out'? How many tens of billions of dollars would the operation cost? Can America keep the anti-terrorism coalition in tact? Can America create another coalition? Can such a risky operation be undertaken while the Middle East is aflame? If the American troops have to stay in Iraq for a length of time after accomplishing their immediate objective, how will Iran react to that?

Not a single expert said that the operation could not be launched successfully. Some stated that as many as 75,000 troops might have to stay on for as long as three years to ensure security and to protect the regime that might have been established. Dr. Hamza, a former senior nuclear engineer who defected from Iraq, and Mr. Butler suggested that Mr. Hussein might acquire nuclear weapons by 2005, his principal source of supplies for the crucial components being the former Soviet Republics and the route for them being through Syria. Some experts maintained that Mr. Hussein had always supported terrorists. Regarding coalition stability, the former Defence Secretary, Casper Weinberger, opined that they would all fall in line once they saw the U.S. achieving success. As for a post-Saddam Hussein scenario, it would not be easy to bring together the external opposition elements, which are known, and the internal elements, which are not known but which must surely exist. However, this should not be an insuperable problem. As for Iran's reaction, if it was made clear from the beginning that the American presence would be thinned out in predictable stages, it might not have a big objection after all. Regarding the cost, no one had any guess, though most seemed to think it ought to be less than the $70 billions the Gulf War had cost and most of which was paid for by others. But if the U.S. had to maintain a long-term presence and pay for the inevitable reconstruction work, the figure could be as high as $200 billions. As Mr. Biden said, America would have to go in to destroy and then pay to rebuild what was destroyed. About Mr. Hussein's links with terrorist outfits, Mr. Butler volunteered the information that when he was Australian Ambassador to Thailand, there had been an Iraq-supported plot to attack the embassies of America, Britain and Australia. Not one expert challenged the basic, underlying premise that Mr. Hussein was a menace and had to be got rid of.

The hearings appeared to be a healthy demonstration of the functioning of American democracy. However, a strongly discordant voice was introduced by Scott Ritter, an American expert with UNSCOM who had worked for seven years as a weapons inspector in Iraq. He was devastating in his interview, aired immediately after the Senate hearings. Describing the hearings as a `sham', Mr. Ritter said Mr. Hussein did not pose any threat to the national interests of the United States, that Iraq's nuclear capability had been thoroughly destroyed and that Mr. Butler or Dr. Hamza had not produced a shred of evidence to support their guess about Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons by 2005. He stated that the U.N. inspectors had not been thrown out by Mr. Hussein in 1998 but pulled out since the U.S. wanted to bomb Iraq, which it did two days later. He added that Mr. Butler was a complicit in this American game. Many of the inspectors, Mr. Ritter maintained, had done espionage work for the U.S. He did not agree about Iraq's alleged links with terrorist groups, pointing out that Mr. Hussein was an enemy of fundamentalists. There was absolutely no evidence of Iraq having any weapons of mass destruction. It did have sarin and tabu nerve gases, but they had been largely destroyed. Even if Iraq had managed to hide some munitions, they would be completely harmless by now due to degradation. He described the hype about Iraq as having nothing to do with facts and everything to do with politics.

It should be mentioned that Mr. Ritter appeared clearly disappointed at not having been invited as a witness at the hearings. The House will hold its own hearings shortly. There is some speculation whether the fact that Saddam Hussein is an unfinished business of the previous Bush administration has anything to do with all this.

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