Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Making the Kashmir verdict work

By K. K. Katyal

It was the job of the politicians of the major parties to manage the complexities and evolve a credible, workable dispensation. Instead of rising to the challenge, they slumped.

DO THE squabbling politicians of Jammu and Kashmir realise the enormity of their wrongdoing? It is not just a matter of delay in Government formation — not a rare phenomenon in the country's politics — caused by their clumsy manoeuvres, but of a bigger danger. The valuable opportunity for reversing the destructive drift in the affairs of the State, the country, the subcontinent, even the entire South Asian region, may be squandered. And the momentum generated by the pullback of Indian troops from the border may peter out.

Think of the gains that could accrue from the outcome of the poll and you will get some idea of the price that may have to be paid for the failure of the political class to respect the logic of the verdict. The electorate showed its support for the ballot, as against the bullet, not just by undertaking the hazardous task of going to the polling booths but by its preference for a new beginning through a new set of players. The voters made use of the all-important instrument of democracy to indicate their rejection of terrorism. How will they feel if they find the democratic exercise rendered futile? They may slip down the abyss of cynicism, losing faith in the democratic process for an end to their woes. Apart from the great psychological change among the people, there was the promise of the poll verdict paving the way for a dialogue between New Delhi and the chosen representatives (with a good measure of credibility as interlocutors) on core issues such as autonomy of the State, and specific steps to end the alienation of the people and the era of fear and uncertainty. There was a hope of the indigenous terrorists having second thoughts about the efficacy of "jehad" and, thus, of a perceptible decline in acts of violence and disruption, leading in turn to the thinning of the armed forces. The international community, notably major powers such as the U.S., had begun to renew pressure on the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf (who, it was clear, would continue to call most of the shots) to honour his promise to ensure a permanent end to infiltration of terrorists from the areas under his control, into India. Simultaneously, there was a step-up in the exhortations to India to resume dialogue with Pakistan on outstanding issues, including Kashmir. All this could well be jeopardised by the pettiness of the State's politicians (and, in the case of one national party, of its central leadership).

The Congress could have avoided sending out negative signals for which it may pay dearly at the national level in crucial situations in the none-too-distant future. The party, it was clear, (1) did not possess the skill and maturity needed to build — and to work — a coalition and, (2) showed utter disregard for all considerations, including those related to national interest, in its craze for power.

As for coalition-making, the Congress leadership does not seem to have learnt any lesson from its unpleasant experience in the last six years when it was out of power at the Centre. Not that it did not address the issue. There was the Pachmarhi Declaration, and the debate within the party that preceded and followed it. The changed political context, in other words, the end of the days of the single-party rule, obviously failed to induce pragmatism in its thinking. This was first evident in the middle of 1999 when there was an opportunity for a non-BJP coalition after the loss of confidence by the first Vajpayee Government. It was clear last week in Jammu and Kashmir when, with a tally of 20 in the 87-member Assembly, the Congress toyed with the idea of assuming power, not with the help of any other party, but by seeking to lure the independents to its fold.

The contrast between the conduct of the common people and members of the political class could not have been sharper. The electorate exercised its judgment with maturity against heavy odds, braving threats, by no means empty, as shown by the poll-related killings by the terrorist bands. The verdict was fractured not because of the voters' fault but because of the complexities of the political situation. It was the job of the politicians of the major parties to manage the complexities and evolve a credible, workable dispensation. Instead of rising to the challenge, they slumped.

The verdict was not entirely devoid of logic — the National Conference was punished, rejected because of its misgovernance, acts of omission and commission, and, instead, confidence reposed in three distinct groups — the Congress, the People's Democratic Party and independents. For any one of them to assume the sole right to form, or to head, a new Government was unrealistic — nay, a ludicrous idea. It was legitimate for the Congress and the PDP to lay claim to the Chief Minister's post, but it was unpardonable for the Congress to engage, on the one hand, in talks with the PDP on power-sharing and, on the other, to try to entice the independents to bolster its strength. The Congress did not hesitate even from seeking to break the PDP. The outgoing Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, whose reluctance to continue in office in a care-taking capacity imposed Governor's Rule on the State was criticised by the rival parties for acting out of pique or out of an ulterior motive. Maybe he had a hidden agenda, but why did they create a situation which helped his plan?

The Congress based its claim to the post of Chief Minister on numbers — that, after the rejected NC, it was the biggest group with 20 members as against the PDP's 16. That was true, but politics is not just arithmetic. There are other considerations as well. The PDP set itself up as a reckonable force in the Kashmir Valley in just three years in highly trying circumstances. Launched by a former Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, it saw his daughter Mehbooba Mufti heroically, identifying herself with the sense of hurt of the people and carving out a new path — secular, pro-India, of rejection of terrorism but of engagement with the separatists. It was for the first time that such a force emerged in the Valley, which represents the core of the Kashmir problem. Its relevance to the agenda of peace, normalcy and stability and its claim to the top post could not be questioned. The State Congress chief, Ghulam Nabi Azad, no doubt was instrumental in reviving party unity and converting it into a fit instrument to fight the election, but he actively involved himself in State politics barely a few months ago, and that too reluctantly. As was known, it needed considerable effort to persuade him to take over as the PCC chief. These facts speak for themselves.

New Delhi's decision to withdraw the troops massed on the border was no doubt a major step towards de-escalating tensions. But will the Central Government follow the logic of this momentous decision? Initial pointers are not particularly encouraging. And as ill-luck would have it, this coincides with the stalemate over ministry-making. There is nothing to suggest that restrictions on air, rail and road travel are to be lifted or that initiatives will be taken for appointment of High Commissioners in each other's capitals. On the contrary, a hardening of the stand on these matters is discernible. The same unfortunately is the case with the suggestions for renewing the dialogue. New Delhi's concern over infiltration is understandable. It could not be blamed for taking a grim view of the increase in the influx of terrorists on the eve and during the elections in the State (as is conceded even by the U.S. and British Governments).

The case for a bold initiative, if anything, is stronger now — without diluting the firm stand against infiltration. Particularly disconcerting is the "clarification" by officials that the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Islamabad for the SAARC summit early next year could not be taken for granted (contrary to the point made by the Minister of State for External Affairs in a television interview). Not long ago India declared that it would not mix bilateral Indo-Pakistan problems with the SAARC. Is there is change in that position?

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