Date:21/10/2002 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2002/10/21/stories/2002102100631000.htm
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Opinion - Editorials

Rise of the Religious Right

THE RISE OF the Religious Right in Pakistan, alarming in its portents as it is, is attributable to several factors. Foremost among these surely was the manner in which the regime of the President, Pervez Musharraf, had persistently and systematically de-legitimised the liberal mainstream parties. The credibility of parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto and the faction of the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif was eroded by evoking portrayals of these as corrupt and incompetent to run the affairs of the country. There may have been some substance in these portrayals and such an officially-sponsored demonisation of these formations might not in itself have been sufficient to mar their prospects in the recently-concluded general elections since the people of Pakistan are familiar enough with the nature of these formations. But the military regime's deliberate move to block the leaders of both parties from contesting the elections, through recourse to dubious legislative measures, made clear to the people that they were not to be led by these twice-tested former Prime Ministers. Hence, the Pakistani voter was left to pick between the second or third rung leaders of the PPP or PML (NS) or the largely colourless leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam) as his choice for Prime Minister. That clearly was no choice at all. It was against this backdrop — where none of the mainstream parties was able to galvanise the voters — that preferences were decided on a constituency-wise basis. In this scenario, the alliance of six religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which had put up a consolidated list of candidates and which seemed to promise an alternative to the PML (QA), the regime's stalking horse, had an advantage.

While such an analysis could explain the Religious Right's unprecedentedly strong performance at the countrywide level (it won 45 of the 272 general seats in the National Assembly), several other factors contributed to its success in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Basing its campaign as it did on a strident opposition to the U.S. - led military action in Afghanistan, the MMA was able to appeal to both the religious as well as nationalist sentiments in the conservative Pashtun belt of both provinces. This reading of political developments in Pakistan's western regions has, however, to be reconciled with the findings (by Pakistani as well as Western observers of the election process) that the military regime did have a hand in shaping the outcome through the extension of administrative support to hand-picked candidates. If a military regime which claims itself to be, and is acclaimed as, a front-line ally in the U.S.-led war on terrorism has actually had a hand in granting power to a religious formation in provinces where terrorists are still being hunted it must be treated as a demonstration of unbelievable skulduggery. Whether the military regime wrought such an outcome or not, it is undeniable that the presence of the MMA in such strength at the centre and in the provinces has considerably enhanced Islamabad's diplomatic leeway. Pakistan's foreign and security policy establishment is now in a position to argue that it can neither proceed against offshoots of the Al-Qaeda nor moderate its policy on Kashmir to the extent that Washington desires since the religious formations (that have been traditionally hardline on both counts) have shown their political relevance.

The MMA's demand that the prime ministerial post be given to one of its leaders has not been taken seriously so far though the permutations and combinations in the extremely fragmented National Assembly could go every which way. Even if it is not a component of the Government to be formed, the MMA would make for a far strong Opposition. While the portents are for a tilt towards the right the question is whether the MMA will hold together over the long run. Other than a penchant for playing to religious sentiments, the six components of the MMA do not have much by way of a common agenda and their leaders are all notorious for their maverick behaviour.

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