Date:15/12/2002 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2002/12/15/stories/2002121504470800.htm

National

'Limits' to which U.S. will push Pak.

By Amit Baruah

NEW DELHI DEC. 14. Is India out of sync with American thinking on Pakistan? Can Washington get Pakistan, its leadership and the ISI Directorate to end terrorism against India? Or, are there limits to what the U.S. can do in Pakistan?

Speaking to a British newspaper a few days ago, the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, suggested that Pakistan be included in the "axis of evil" since it continued to support terrorism.

By implication, Mr. Sinha was calling on the American President, George W. Bush, to include Pakistan in the same category as Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Surely, Mr. Sinha is aware that Pakistan is a key ally in the American "war against terrorism" and there is little danger of Islamabad returning to the doghouse status anytime soon. Yet he is speaking out of concern for what the Pakistani State and the ISI continue to do in India.

Asked about the U.S. expressing concern about Indian activities in Afghanistan, the National Secretary Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, said in Washington that the incident was "behind us". Mr. Mishra has been in the business of foreign policy for a long time; not just in his present avatar. His enigmatic statement only confirms that the Americans have expressed concern about India's rising profile in Afghanistan.

There is little doubt that since Jaswant Singh was shifted to the Finance portfolio, Indian foreign policy has shown some distinct signs of departure from the American position on different issues.

Apart from disagreeing with the U.S. on Pakistan, India has engaged Iraq and Saddam Hussein, continued its cooperation with Iran and Russians on Afghanistan and agreed to a budding trilateral cooperation with the Chinese and Russians.

Not so long ago, a senior Indian official told this correspondent that India could never be a Britain to the U.S. — a ground reality despite the obviously growing cooperation and contacts between the two countries. After September 11, 2001, Indian foreign policy did put Pakistan in a spot with its open and total support for the American war against terrorism. But the gains were short-lived.

Pakistan and the U.S. have been through thick and thin and known each other well for quite some time. Of late, Pakistan has been of considerable concern to the U.S. Yet the Americans have chosen to handle Islamabad as an ally.

All the same, the U.S. is fully aware of the dangers that Pakistan poses as a major exporter of terrorism. But the policy option as of now is to de-fang the terrorists using the same instruments that raised the monster in the first place.

But it has to be stressed that while the Americans have traditionally exercised considerable influence in Pakistan, there are limits to what they can and cannot do to India's western neighbour.

Whatever America's strategic strengths in pushing Pakistan, Washington cannot turn around Islamabad's sponsorship of terrorist networks, including those used against India, without destroying the ISI-led structures that prop up such elements.

Whether the ISI operates at the instance of the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, or without his knowledge seems irrelevant given the scope of the problem that India continues to face.

The U.S. knows India's "issues" well when it comes to Pakistan, but feels that its current strategy in relation to Pakistan is its best bet. India, clearly, thinks otherwise.