Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Hu's challenges

By Bhartendu Kumar Singh

Hu Jintao has to ensure that China continues to rise in a peaceful manner.

AS HU Jintao, the new general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), prepares to take over as President in March, analysts have started speculating about the possible shape of Chinese foreign policy under him. At the CPC's 16th Congress, Mr. Hu refused to spell out a vision, thereby indicating that he might toe the `established line'. However, he will preside over the country during a critical period in which China is expected to continue to rise as a great power and must, therefore, overcome numerous foreign policy challenges.

The most formidable challenges may come from the two `Ts': Taiwan and Tibet (the Chinese leadership views them as domestic rather than foreign policy issues). Taiwan remains the only obstacle in the complete unification of the Chinese nation. The `carrot and stick' policy pursued by the Chinese leaders has failed to impress Taiwan. If Deng Xiaoping came up with the `one country, two systems' formula which permits Taiwan to retain its existing political system, Jiang Zemin went further through his `eight point' proposal in 1995. However, the rise of pro-independence voices in Taiwan, intense lobbying by the Taiwanese authorities to get international recognition for their `independent statehood', and Beijing's deadline to Taiwan to accede to the mainland by 2010 are leading to a complicated situation. There are even unconfirmed reports of a growing Taiwanese interest in nuclear weapons to deter a Chinese attack. The balance of power in East Asia and the security guarantee given by the U.S. to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, 1978, make it more difficult for China to launch a full invasion. At the same time, Mr. Hu cannot be seen as compromising on Taiwan. It is more likely that he will encourage Taiwan to at least agree to a `one China' principle and seek reunification through negotiation.

The other test for Mr. Hu would be Tibet where he has served a full term as the provincial CPC boss. While there, Mr. Hu merely followed the tough approach of the Chinese leadership and there is little indication now that he will soften his attitude after becoming President. And, international support for the Tibetan cause is increasingly limited to concern over human rights violations. In an indication of a softening of his stand, the Dalai Lama, of late, has been sending signals that he is willing to settle for something `less than freedom'. It would be interesting to see if Mr. Hu buys peace with the Tibetans.

The new President will also have to ensure a peaceful and stable peripheral environment around China to enable it to focus on development tasks. Although the 2000 white paper on National Defence defined the overall security situation in the Asia-Pacific as `stable', China is uncomfortable on three counts. First, the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute apart, Japan's growing assertion as a military power continues to be a cause of consternation. It was this factor which led China to oppose the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and their proposal to jointly develop and deploy theatre missile defence (TMD) systems. Second, China is also not happy about the prospects of a `unified' Korea. Under Mr. Jiang, China had followed a two-fold policy: support reunification initiatives and at the same time maintain `special' relationships with the two entities. This balancing act is at best an ad hoc policy. Hence, the more the chances of Korean unification the more will be the pressure on Mr. Hu's China to evolve an enduring policy in order to retain its influence over a unified Korea and discourage it from joining the U.S.-Japan alliance. Third, China is also uncomfortable with the protracted wrangling over the South China Sea dispute. An inordinate delay will mean `energy insecurities' in terms of oil and gas.

The Chinese probably feel more comfortable along their western borders. The border disputes with Russia are more or less resolved and both the countries have established a series of interactive platforms along with the Islamic nations of Central Asia. Even then, China faces three challenges. First, it is worried about the increasing U.S. presence in the region. A U.S.-dominated Central Asia will not only vitiate the stable strategic environment in the region but may also deny vital energy sources to China. The Chinese attempts to dissuade the U.S. through several-coalition building exercises such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are unlikely to have any effect. Second, with Islamic forces asserting themselves in the region, China's province of Xinjiang, populated by the Uighurs, is increasingly becoming a target of fundamentalism, secessionism and terrorism. Third, a challenge might come from Russia itself. The strategic partnership treaty of 2001 not withstanding, Russia will be loath to follow the Chinese lead for too long. As soon as it comes out of its economic stagnation, Moscow is bound to assert its presence not only in Central Asia but even beyond.

Beyond these regional problems, China also has enough to do at the international level. There is a broad consensus that its continued rise as a great power might even lead to superpower status! The debate is, however, about a more fundamental question: what kind of superpower would China like to be? Until the 1970s, its behaviour in the international arena was that of a `revisionist' which was more interested in bringing down the existing system led by `hegemons' such as the U.S. Witness, for example, Mao's `two-camp' theory in the 1950s and the `three-worlds' theory in the 1960s and 1970s. However, under Deng, China overcame its ideological barriers and started integrating itself with the international system. Under Mr. Jiang China has been more accommodative on major international issues and has so far belied the `China threat theories' manufactured by the Pentagon. Its initiatives in creating regional security architectures, promotion of confidence-building measures, resolution of many a bilateral dispute and active participation in peacekeeping and peace-building ventures under the U.N. are clear indicators of a flexible attitude. But the process of political socialisation is far from complete. Mr. Hu has to ensure that China continues to rise in a peaceful manner. Only time will tell if China develops as a benevolent superpower eager to cooperate with the U.S. or as one more interested in carving out a separate geopolitical space run by a `Pax Sinica'. Also, Mr. Hu would have to do more image-building exercises on at least two counts: human rights and democracy. It is on these two issues that there are sharp and often irreconcilable differences between China and the West.

Finally, Mr. Hu would need to seek acceptability for Chinese perspectives on international relations. The security practices of the post-Mao leadership have gradually led to the evolution of a `new security concept' which aims at augmenting comprehensive national strength, creating a peaceful environment and maintaining internal stability. At the same time, China is also promoting the idea of an alternative world order based on multi-polarity, non-interference in internal affairs and sovereign equality. In many ways, therefore, Mr. Hu has his tasks cut out. His success, however, will depend on factors such as his ability to control factionalism in the CPC, support of the PLA, his ability to continue the reforms, high growth rate and enrichment of China, and above all, his ability to overcome the legacy of Mr. Jiang. With very little international experience, he does not seem to have a vision of his own and, therefore, is not expected to do a `Gorbachev'. Yet, once firmly ensconced in power, he may not hesitate to undertake bold initiatives with regard to contentious issues, as was done by Deng. We probably have to wait another five years.

(The writer is Senior Research Scholar, Chinese Studies Division, School of International Studies, JNU.)

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