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THE LIBERATION Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which offered a unilateral ceasefire on Christmas Eve 2001, broke the peace on Good Friday 2004, training its guns on a most unlikely enemy its former eastern military commander, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna). The Sri Lankan Government has said it considers the latest fighting between the Tigers "a violation of the ceasefire agreement." The President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, has ordered the security forces to "take necessary steps to enforce law and order." With the lines of demarcation between rebel and government-controlled territories in the East hazy at best, one small incident could snowball. Two years ago, on April 10, 2002, the LTTE leader, V. Prabakaran, accorded `Col.' Karuna pride of place a seat next to him at his first major international press conference. At that press conference, Mr. Prabakaran acknowledged the prowess of his then military commander for the two eastern districts Batticaloa and Amparai by stating that the greatest military victory of the LTTE was the defeat of the Sri Lankan Government's `Operation Jayasikuru' between 1998 and 2001, in which the rebel forces were led by `Col.' Karuna. Now, Mr. Prabakaran and `Col.' Karuna are at war. The fighting between the LTTE and the breakaway faction will test not just their military might but `Col.' Karuna's ability to emerge as a popular leader. A silent section of Batticaloa residents relate to the political positions he has adopted. However, predictably in a society where the gun is the main opinion-maker, this support base is rapidly shifting. The LTTE has everything to lose if `Col.' Karuna's challenge endures its image as a disciplined organisation and the status of "sole representative" of the Tamil-speaking people. It has branded `Col.' Karuna a "traitor" and has begun a war against him. After a nearly month-long build up along the banks of an eastern river that runs as a natural boundary between the areas under the control of Mr. Prabakaran and `Col.' Karuna, the northern Tigers broke into the East on April 9. In a pre-dawn operation, the northern rebels moved about 10 km into `Col.' Karuna's territory, and started consolidating positions. According to `Col.' Karuna's supporters, the eastern situation would have been different if the former LTTE military commander for Trincomalee, Pathuman (who was seated next to `Col.' Karuna at the April 2002 press conference) had not been replaced by a Prabakaran loyalist, Sornam, just after `Col.' Karuna's rebellion on March 3. According to `Col.' Karuna, Pathuman was "changed" because he shared his views and was his friend. The Trincomalee equation, hence, is the crucial factor in the fighting between the Tigers, both militarily and politically. `Col.' Karuna controls over 70 per cent of the eastern Batticaloa district and a small part of the neighbouring Amparai district. An ethnically-mixed region, with a near equal share of the island's main ethnic groups Sinhalese, Muslims and Tamils the East has to be carried along for any solution to the island-nation's problems. The "traditional homelands" concept was the basis of the "temporary merger" of the North and the East under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The move did not go down well with Sinhalese and has never been accepted by the island's hardliners. In addition, there have always been apprehensions among Sinhalese and Muslims on their status in a post-conflict scenario. It is this cauldron that is the stage for `Col.' Karuna's rebellion. With the LTTE deciding to settle scores through the gun, the course of the peace process will be determined by the fighting between the Tigers and whether it remains "internal."
- VSS
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