Ranabir Ray Choudhury

IT WOULD be a grave error on the part of the nation to judge the outcome of the Prime Minister's visit to the US against the canvas of past interaction between the two countries, for the simple reason that there no longer exists a basis for such a comparison.

In fact, the two situations are vastly different both in terms of international politics and in terms of personalities. It is in terms of the requirements of the future that the visit must be evaluated, specifically whether the direction set for the evolution of bilateral relations will benefit the two nations (particularly for India) and keep mutual costs to a minimum.

In essence, for India, the basic requirement of the future (say, 30 years) is to ensure the continued growth of the economy and, based on this performance, to increase its influence generally in the comity of nations. As regards the latter, it can be safely said that never before since Independence has India found itself in a situation as potentially promising as now. First, India is today is in the forefront of the so called `emerging economies', which means that it enjoys an economic presence in the world today unlike anything in the past.

Second, with the end of the Cold War — during which period every aspect of a nation's activity was viewed against the great ideological division separating the planet into two heavily armed camps — international relations today is in a state of flux, the inference being that, if India plays its cards wisely, it can attain a position of respect never before attained.

Against this general background, to what extent has Dr Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington either harmed or benefited India's interests? If there is agreement on the point that the US's acceptance of India's nuclear-power status must enhance the nation's international standing (power, after all, flows out of the barrel of a gun), the Joint Statement would tend to suggest that the visit has been an unalloyed success for the country.

Among other things, to quote the Joint Statement, the US President, Mr George Bush, described India as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology," a classification which brackets it with the US itself, Britain, France, Russia and China and, more significantly, excludes it from the group of unwanted nuclear weapons-capable countries, which includes Pakistan, North Korea, et al. Clearly, this description of India's nuclear policies being `responsible' has added vastly to the nation's acceptability to the international nuclear-weapons community, having the effect of bestowing it with informal nuclear-power status. But this is not all. The Bush Administration has gone a step further and has committed itself to helping India gain formal nuclear-power status by altering perceptions in US Congress and among members of the international nuclear-power community.

Not only has Mr Bush said that India "should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such (officially nuclear-power) states," according to the Joint Statement, he has said he would "seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies" and would also "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur."

What has New Delhi agreed to give in return for this US initiative to help India attain formal nuclear-state status? More important, has India agreed to concede more than is the case with current members of the `nuclear club'? The Joint Statement is clear on the second point when it says that the Prime Minister conveyed that India "would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States".

These "responsibilities and practices" would comprise "identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonisation and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines."

If China and Russia have been able to agree to these stipulations generally with a clear conscience (even if they have reservations), there is no reason why New Delhi should not pay the same price, if price it is. There has been some controversy on the subject of separating the military and civil uses of nuclear reactors, which is clearly an important input when toting up the costs of the commitments made by New Delhi. But the picture is not clear given the conflicting stands on the issue taken by people who should know what they are talking about.

To take an example, while two former chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, M. R. Srinivasan and P. K. Ayengar, have pointed at the difficulties associated with such separation, another AEC chairman, Homi Sethna, has said categorically that the two facilities can be separated and that there should "be no difficulty in implementing this system."

This apart, India has a lot to gain from the "full civil nuclear energy cooperation" offered by Washington as well as from working together on the commercial aspects of space technology. Admittedly, there will be pinpricks in the shape of the nuts and bolts of the cooperation schemes not being to the liking of either of the parties, but to argue from this premise that it would be good to miss the wood for the trees would be tantamount to hurting the interests of the country itself in the evolving new world order where major strategic realignments among nations are in the offing. In fact, the agreements and understanding that have flowed from the Prime Minister's visit to Washington should not be seen as being limited in time to the preparations made for the summit.

A re-think on the strategic relationship between the two countries has been in the works for some time, as is indicated by the `completion' of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, which was begun in January 2004 and which was designed "to increase cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, high-technology trade and missile defence."

That this broad cooperation is an integral ongoing process is indicated by the fact that, officially, the next phase envisioned is "engagement in a number of key areas (such as strategic, energy security and economic matters) in which cooperation has previously been limited or non-existent." Strategic cooperation with the US cannot be faulted on ideological grounds if such cooperation leads to an enhanced position for India in the international community just as a similar exercise with China should not be run down for the same reason if the nation stands to benefit from such a relationship.

Admittedly, costs are involved but they should be seen in the proper perspective and controlled domestically because the strategic prize at the end of the day is what every patriotic Indian should look forward to. While the strategic benefits for India are there for all to see, the gain to Washington would perhaps lie in the fact that in the emerging world scenario, where it would have to contend with an economically powerful China and other new economic giants, it would be so much more convenient to have New Delhi as a friend with a long-term involvement.

This, however, does not mean that India-US cooperation will automatically extend to the WTO negotiations or to support from Washington for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. In all probability, such support will not be easily forthcoming because of other, tactical, considerations such as the influence of domestic trade lobbies on American politics and the operation of US legislation governing relationships with countries such as Iran and Libya.

New Delhi will have to use all its resources to overcome the obstacles in its path on such issues discretely, which is a far better way of getting on with the job of promoting the nation's interests instead of trying to put all the blame on the growing strategic closeness between India and the US, from which both nations stand to gain.

© Copyright 2000 - 2009 The Hindu Business Line