G. Parthasarathy

The more important question that arises from Vasily Mitrokhin's revelations is not whether any individual or political party received money from one or the other superpower, but whether their foreign links compromised national security and sovereignty. Both superpowers expended huge resources to "win hearts and minds" worldwide. There were many who believed in the values, ideals and policies practised by one or the other of the contending parties. G. Parthasarathy recalls the Cold War pol itics vis-à-vis India.

VASILY MITROKHIN, who died in 2004, was a KGB operative, who worked in the Soviet Union's spy agency's archives from 1956 to 1985. He copied documents and defected to the West in 1992, just after the Soviet Union disintegrated. The two volumes of the Mitrokhin Archives reflect the realities of the global Cold War rivalries in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s. The Soviets then funded political parties, politicians, newspapers, trade unions and journalists and set up front organisations such as the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society to influence Indian policies.

Though they acted more subtly, the Americans were not far behind in building their lobbies in India. Disinformation was regularly used by the superpowers to discredit each other. More Soviet and American diplomats were expelled from India for espionage during this period than diplomats from any other country, including Pakistan.

The more important question that arises from Mitrokhin's revelations is not whether any individual, or political party received money from one or the other superpower, but whether their foreign links compromised national security and sovereignty. Both superpowers expended huge resources to "win hearts and minds" worldwide. There were many who believed in the values, ideals and policies practised by one, or other, of the contending parties.

There were ideological differences within the ruling Congress Party. Those reflecting Sardar Patel's thinking such as Morarji Desai, S. K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh believed in liberal market economics and distrusted Soviet intentions. Others like Krishna Menon, Mohan Kumaramangalam and D. P. Dhar, labelled as "progressives," admired Soviet achievements. Civil servants and advisers such as B. K. Nehru and L. K. Jha favoured economic liberalisation. Others like T. N. Kaul and P. N. Haksar were Left leaning.

In a confidential assessment of Indira Gandhi's Cabinet colleagues in 1967, the then American Ambassador described C. Subramniam and Sachin Chaudhury to the White House, as competent and forward looking.

But it would be ridiculous to suggest that these individuals, who shaped Indian policies for decades, would allow ideological predilections to override considerations of national interest.

The Indian diplomat (codenamed "Prokhor"), whom Mitrokhin claims was seduced by the Soviets, called their bluff and told them that his bosses at home were well aware of his interests after office hours.

The differences among the Congress leaders came into the open when the party split in 1969. The Soviet Union decided to back Indira Gandhi. Her opponents were dubbed as "reactionaries".

Congress leaders visiting Moscow constantly spoke of the need for the Soviet Union to support the unity of "progressive and democratic forces" in India. The aim was clear. Lacking an absolute majority in Parliament after the Congress split, Indira Gandhi got Moscow to force the CPI to support a Congress-led minority government. The CPI lost public confidence when it was compelled to extend this support through the Emergency years.

When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she unceremoniously dumped the CPI and told President Ronald Reagan in 1981 in Cancun that her main political challenge was from the Communists. Even in the heyday of Indo-Soviet Bhai Bhai, Indira Gandhi never allowed Soviet leaders to take her for granted. She rejected personal intervention by Prime Minister Alexie Kosygin to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and refused to endorse the Brezhnev Doctrine for "Collective Security" in Asia.

Indira Gandhi was deeply suspicious of President Richard Nixon's intentions and felt that the CIA was working to destabilise her government. She believed that the CIA had a role in the ouster of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975 and of Z. A. Bhutto in 1977. Her apprehensions were not unjustified, given the CIA actions in Chile and elsewhere.

When the Janata Party Government assumed office in 1977, Soviet leaders were concerned about the impact of the change of guard on Indo-Soviet relations. In April 1977, an anxious Andrei Gromyko was relieved when the External Affairs Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, assured him that Indo-Soviet relations were strong enough to transcend the fate of "any single individual or political party".

A senior Jimmy Carter Administration official, however, informed the Indian Ambassador, Mr Nani Palkhivala, in Washington in 1979 that the Soviet Union was working to bring down Morarji Desai's government. The Soviets were not too concerned about India's improving ties with the US.

Mr Vajpayee's 1979 visit to China and our tacit acquiescence of the genocidal Pol Pot Regime in Cambodia, however, led to concerns in Moscow about India joining the emerging China-US Axis, directed against the Soviet Union. Morarji Desai received a very warm letter from President Carter when he resigned in 1979. Charan Singh, who was not similarly greeted, soon sought to invite Kosygin to India. But this did not stop Charan Singh from strongly opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A sulking President Carter then had to be coaxed by the former British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, to congratulate Indira Gandhi, when she won the elections held in December 1979.

Political parties in India obviously have links abroad. They receive money when in office through defence and other contracts. Moscow funded its friends and allies through over-invoicing of Indian exports of hosiery, tobacco, garments, rice and tea.

While mainstream political parties could have benefited from such "deals", they never agreed to proposals that would make India a client state of any foreign power.

This cannot, unfortunately, be said about all our parties. For, according to the diaries of a former Soviet Ambassador to India, I. A. Benediktov, CPI leaders met him regularly to ask for funds. One senior CPI leader actually thanked the Soviet Union for supporting China during the Chinese aggression of 1962 — an action tantamount to treason, at a time when Indian soldiers were sacrificing their lives to defend the country.

The Communist movement in India split in 1963, just after the Soviet Union expressed support for and provided arms to India and changed course towards China. The CPI pledged loyalty to Moscow. The CPI (M) aligned with Beijing.

As the Sino-Soviet rift widened and led to violent clashes in 1969 on their borders, the CPI, which earlier backed China in its conflict against India in 1962, became stridently critical of China. Everything that Moscow said to condemn China was echoed by the CPI, and Moscow-backed newspapers and front organisations in India. The move to upgrade diplomatic relations and send Mr K. R. Narayanan as Ambassador to China was not welcomed either by Moscow or by the CPI and its front organisations.

The CPI(M) similarly did not know how to react when China invaded Vietnam in 1979, with Deng Xiao Ping vowing to teach Vietnam a "lesson" just as China had done to India in 1962. Speaking in Vladivostok in 1985 Mr Mikhail Gorbachev announced that rapprochement with China was on its way. The CPI dutifully echoed Moscow's new thinking.

These events are relevant because what both Communist parties are now advocating is that on such crucial issues as our nuclear weapons programme and on current differences between Washington and Beijing, India should follow the line advocated by China. They conveniently forget that both in the Nixon and Clinton years, the US and China colluded against India on crucial issues. This is their concept of "non-alignment" and an "independent" foreign policy.

While one can ignore such views as flowing from ideological myopia, one naturally has misgivings when the CPI (M) demands a reduction in our defence spending at a time when its ideological patrons in Beijing are not only increasing their defence spending, but also providing tanks, aircraft, frigates, missiles and nuclear weapons know-how to Pakistan.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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