Date:26/10/2005 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2005/10/26/stories/2005102602271000.htm

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Uses of domestic dissent in foreign policy

Harish Khare

There is no reason why non-official voices cannot be raised to send a message to the Bush White House that public opinion in India will not permit an unequal deal.

AMERICAN UNDER-SECRETARY of State Nicholas Burns' visit last week revived all the doubts, reservations, and opposition to the July 18, 2005 India-United States civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement. Doubts and questions have never been fully answered. These doubts got deepened when India chose to vote with the United States and against Iran on September 24 at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

Doubts have been voiced from three sources. First, from within the strategic community. Some remain genuinely concerned about the Indian establishment's ability to think through issues involved in separating civilian from military nuclear facilities. Some simply feel cut up that they have not been consulted, before and after the deal. Others are intrinsically hostile because of their hidden liaison with the BJP crowd. And, some of the sceptics are "Indian bomb" fundamentalists who are not prepared to countenance any current or future restraint on Bharat Mata's freedom to go in for a higher stage of nuclear weaponisation.

Secondly, sections of the vocal Muslim community have spoken up, particularly after New Delhi's Iran vote. Most of them find themselves in the unfamiliar waters of strategic affairs. They are not faulting the Government for voting against Iran per se. Rather their complaint is articulated as a protest against a deviation from the independent course of our foreign policy and principles of non-alignment. Still, there is nothing amiss with sections of the Muslim community expressing themselves on this issue; no less a person than the Prime Minister himself told the media in New York last month that one of the factors that must weigh in any decision on Iran would be the presence of the world's second largest Shia population in India.

The third source of opposition is the most serious. The Left and the Right have converged in their opposition against the centre. A section of the BJP has opposed the July agreement, for no other reason than the deal was done by a regime other than the one headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Like sections of the Muslim community, the BJP faults the July agreement as compromising the national autonomy that Pokhran II was supposed to have cemented. The Samajwadis and other third front candidates have also dissented, some for the sake of the Muslim vote and others from deeply ingrained habits of anti-Congressism.

Then there is the Left, led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The Left has voiced its opposition in the most systematic and reasoned manner; there has been no shouting at the top of the voice, only articulation of the party's long-held positions and a nuanced anti-Americanism. The Left promises to carry on its reasoned opposition; sensibly it has come to anchor its opposition in a professed anti-Americanism. The Left has promised to keep at it, mobilising public opinion against what it perceives as misplaced priorities of the Manmohan Singh Government.

Except a statement by the Prime Minister and a perfunctory discussion in Parliament in the last session, there has been no detailed or passionate defence of the September vote and the July agreement. Only the Foreign Secretary keeps on, valiantly arguing the case. The Congress party has been strangely silent on the issue, partly because it is becoming increasingly a stranger to the world of ideas and polices. Within the AICC establishment, most of those familiar with the intricate world of foreign policy and diplomacy have migrated to the Government. Above all, there is an institutional indifference to dissent, disagreement, and discussion. Nor is there any appreciation of the need to mobilise domestic public opinion in favour of this policy or that initiative.

The July agreement rests on a structure of reciprocity. But the deepest unstated fear is that the Manmohan Singh Government will allow itself to be railroaded by the Bush administration into keeping its part of the bargain while the United States will pretend that a difficult American Congress has refused to play ball. The White House is not averse to using the American constitutional arrangement to extract concessions from foreign interlocutors, friendly or unfriendly. For instance, when after Congressman Tom Lantos exhibited bad taste and called India's External Affairs Minister all kinds of names, the Government voted against Iran at Geneva; this gave rise to the inevitable inference that New Delhi had given in to an orchestrated jugalbandi.

The broader issue is why the Indian Government cannot creatively use domestic dissent to optimise its foreign policy agenda. True, the Indian Constitution gives the executive complete autonomy of initiative in matters of defence and foreign policy; nor is the executive obliged to submit any agreement or treaty for parliamentary approval. However, this stipulation in no way exempts any government from the larger obligation of democratic accountability.

Dissent and disagreement ought to be welcomed by the Government and the ruling party of the day. Of course, the assumption is that such dissent will not be leveraged in internal political battles. Every responsible political party in India is duty-bound to express itself on matters of foreign and defence policy. This responsibility has become even more onerous because of the creeping infirmities in our public discourse. The popular media are incapable of educating the citizenry on issues such as the nuances of the July agreement or the Iran vote. Media that seem to be so breathtakingly fixated on "scandalous tapes" or some astrologer predicting his own death cannot possibly become an instrument of public enlightenment. This is not a happy development for a democratic system.

As it is, over the years we have blunted and submerged any exercise in democratic accountability in the vastly consequential areas of national security. The general argument that any discussion of defence matters would demoralise jawans has been flung in the face of all those who have had questions about defence budgets or priorities. In the early days, when India faced far graver threats to its existence, Jawaharlal Nehru was not averse to talking complicated foreign policy matters before massive crowds.

On the other hand, a leader and a government ought to have freedom of initiative in policy matters in determining national interests. A heavy responsibility goes with that initiative. Within months of India becoming a free nation, Pandit Nehru delineated the leaders' responsibility thus: "Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say, but in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dares do anything, which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore whether a country is imperialist, socialist or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country."

Our current problem is that ever since we gave in to the logic and forces of globalisation, there has remained considerable doubt about our leaders' capacity to think and take decisions in the national interest. It is a question of national self-assurance and competence in dealing with an exacting world. Doubts about leaders' ability persist because the pursuit of power of our political parties has become totally divorced from a faith in democratic principles and this disdain exhibits itself most in the realm of foreign policy.

We need an ideal mix of dissent and initiative. The Manmohan Singh government would do well to use domestic opposition to maximise its bargaining position in international forums. The winter session of Parliament should be used to let national sentiments and fears be expressed on both sides of the divide. Admittedly, there are limits to what the government can say in Parliament. But there is no reason why non-official voices cannot be raised to send a message to the Bush White House that public opinion in India will not permit an unequal deal.