Back The US dilemma in Iraq — Exiting without foul-up
B. S. Raghavan
| Many in the US administration are no doubt distressed by the loss of American lives in Iraq and the drain on the exchequer. But they must also be painfully conscious that all this would turn out to an egregious waste if they do not make sure that Iraq does not become a nest of terrorists under Al Qaeda/Taliban. Even the critics of the Bush Administration concede that Iraq has a long way to go before its administration and security forces can get on top of insurgency. It is a cruel dilemma for the US President and his advisers, says B. S. Raghavan. |
More than 30,000 civilians killed in military operations and terrorist attacks. An astronomical amount exceeding $250 billion — which could have kept the world hunger-free for nine years and helped immunise every child in every country for 100 years — already drained away in keeping Iraq under heel and $200 million sucked into the vortex every passing day.
No end in sight to insurgency, making Iraq's passage to who-knows-where the messiest, if not the bloodiest, in a nation's history.
All in an overpowering orgy of irrepressible self-righteousness and inexplicable foolhardiness indulged in by the putative supercop of the world, to the extent of concocting the grounds of the exorbitantly expensive misadventure and blithely wishing away the lessons of entanglements in Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s and the 1960s. All without getting even a sign of gratitude or without the certainty of lasting impact of the arduous labours.
Severe jolt
No wonder, there has been a rapid worsening of the mood of the American public in respect of what has been dubbed "Bush's war", leading to a plunge in the President's ratings to an all-time low 35 per cent. The dismay and anger have spilled over into the US Congress which recently witnessed acrimonious scenes triggered by a trenchant criticism of the Bush Administration by Congressperson John Murtha, a Vietnam veteran highly respected for his mastery of Defence issues, who wanted the troops pulled back from Iraq without any more dilly-dallying.
There is general agreement that the eloquent and convincing case he made has given a severe jolt to even perfervid supporters of the policy of sticking to the guns in Iraq until it is ready (as Mr Melvin R. Laird, who was President Richard Nixon's Secretary of Defence and carried out the US withdrawal from Vietnam, put it in an article in Foreign Affairs), "to preserve modern culture, Western democracy, the global economy, and all else that is threatened by the spread of barbarism in the name of religion... It is not politically correct, nor is it comforting. But it is the truth..."
There has, however, been a nagging ambiguity about what precisely was the mission that the Bush Administration had set before itself when it embarked on the ill-advised invasion of Iraq.
Immediately after it, Mr Bush, exulted: "Mission accomplished!" At that stage, the only things accomplished were the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq by the "Coalition of the Willing" of which the dominant constituent meeting most of the requirements in troops and resources was the US, with the UK and a few other countries tagging along.
Jumble of surmises
Once it was found that the pretext drummed up in the run-up to the war — possession of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Saddam Hussein — was fictitious, the US did not come up with any clear-cut rationale for subsequently "staying the course".
Neither its allies nor UN members were told what the mission really was, leaving the field free for surmises. On the basic political plane, was it all planned with an eye on the presidential election due in 2004 and for sewing up the second term with a bold and spectacular feat? Or, for getting control over oil? Or, for establishing a beachhead to ensure that Iraq did not become a breeding ground for terrorist combines under the umbrella of Al Qaeda?
Or, to carve out a sphere of influence in West Asia to serve notice on nations there and elsewhere that they had better toe the US line and behave, else?
Or, to implant democratic institutions as a way of bringing Iraq to the mainstream?
Or, for fattening US companies with lucrative contracts for so-called reconstruction projects?
Perhaps, as in all such situations, it is a medley of a variety of motivations of the hidden springs of which even the principal actors may not be aware. Some interesting pointers are nevertheless available in Mr Laird's Foreign Affairs essay which, in fact, is the only attempt so far to weave all of them into a coherent pattern.
For instance, he asserts that the "intelligence blunder" about the mythical WMD was no reason for the US "to pack up our tanks and go home" in the light of "a new mission to transform Iraq... the frontline in the war on terror — not because terrorists dominate there, but because of the opportunity to displace militant extremists' Islamist rule throughout the region."
He rejoices that "... the effect of our stand in Iraq is already being felt around the Middle East.
Opposition parties are demanding to be heard. Veiled women are insisting on a voice. Syrian troops have left Lebanon. Egypt has held an election. Iran is being pressured by the United States and Europe alike on its development of nuclear weapons.
The voices for change are building in Saudi Arabia. The movement even has a name: Kifaya — `Enough!' The parasites who have made themselves fat by promoting ignorance, fear, and repression in the region are squirming... terrorists believe (Bush) is in this fight to the end...Picture those oil reserves in the hands of religious extremists whose idea of utopia is to knock the world economy and culture back more than a millennium to the dawn of Islam."
Cruel dilemma
That about sums up the raison d'etre offered for the US embroiling itself in what hawks like the Vice-President, Mr Dick Cheney, and those of his ilk, echoing the Laird doctrine, call "nation-building" in Iraq, whatever that may connote.
Unfortunately for them, the voices from Iraq are unpropitious. For instance, Mr Abdul Aziz Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Shiite Muslim religious party that leads the transitional government and whose armed wing is the most feared of Iraq's many factional forces, is bitterly critical of the "mistaken or wrong policies" of the Americans who, he says, have refused to give Iraqis a free hand in fighting terror and managing their own affairs.
In effect, the major factors responsible for "the expansion of terrorism" is the dog-in-the-manger attitude and the constant interference of the Americans who prevented the Interior or Defence Ministries "from carrying out tasks they are capable of doing, and also in the way they are dealing with the terrorists".
In the light of these developments, it is easy to see the cruel dilemma the US President and his top advisers face. In their hearts of hearts, they are no doubt equally distressed by the agony caused by the loss of American lives and the drain on the exchequer.
On the other hand, they must also be painfully conscious that all the efforts and expense from the US side would turn out to be an egregious waste if they do not make sure that by default, Iraq does not become a vipers' nest of fanatical jihadi terrorists under the dictates of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Even the critics of the Bush Administration would concede that Iraq has still a long way to go before its administrative superstructure and security forces can be expected to get on top of insurgency.
Mr Abdul Aziz Hakim himself admitted the need for the US forces to remain in the country as a `guest' until the country's security forces, which numbered 212,000 now, were brought up to the mark, equipped with more weapons and more firepower, which also was not possible without American assistance over time.
`Spontaneous combustion'
Mr Bush and his team cannot be blamed if they thought that this was no time to cut-and-run, as the saying goes. But this, in itself, does not justify leaving every thing in a state of drift or "spontaneous combustion". Hitherto, different functionaries of the US Government and the Armed Forces have been coming out with a confusing variety of formulations with no precise indication of phases, milestones, numbers and duration
The anger and anguish finding expression in the polls, the media and the Congress are more the result of exasperation at not getting from the Administration a clear-cut idea of the goals of the US policy in Iraq and a sharply delineated time-table depicting the stages of progress in getting specified numbers of Iraqi battalions in full combat readiness and the corresponding numbers of US troops that would be brought back home.
In a certain sense, it is the failure of the Bush Administration to persuasively set out the considerations that make a precipitous withdrawal work against the US', as also the world's own, security interests and the propensity of Mr Bush to act first, and explain seldom that are at the root of the present discontent.
The best person for Mr Bush and the members of his team to model themselves on is Winston Churchill who kept the people on his side during the worst crises of the Second World War by following the simple strategy of telling it like it was and leaving them in no doubt as to the government's policies and aims.
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