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Opinion
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News Analysis
P. S. Suryanarayana
THE INTENSIFYING diplomatic engagement between India and China defies the conventional norms of power politics in international relations. Both are widely seen as emerging major powers, with China being ranked way ahead of India at present but with New Delhi too being recognised as an earnest aspirant. And, while endless friction between the two is what an old-style pundit would predict, significant indeed is the growing perception in East Asia that it would be "simplistic" to expect them to "collide." In a definitive comment, Singapore's Senior Minister and former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has said the border issue between them "is being resolved in a manner which would not result in any conflict." Mr. Goh and Singapore are not alone in beginning to see signs of "potential cooperation" between China and India on the wider East Asian scene. The timing of such observations is no less important. At the recent East Asia Summit (EAS), organised by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), India and China did not find themselves on the same wavelength on a key issue, especially during the preparatory deliberations. The question was whether the EAS countries or the smaller ASEAN+3 forum, which includes China but not India, should be the prime mover for creating an East Asia Community over time. In the event, China's preference prevailed, with the ASEAN+3 being designated as the prime mover, at least for now. However, the outcome was accomplished in a manner that India found acceptable.
Realignment of forces
If this episode has, in the end, boosted the confidence of ASEAN, the second round of strategic dialogue between India and China, held in Beijing from January 9 to 11, reflected the current trends towards a "major realignment of forces" in Asia. Addressing the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, after heading the Indian delegation during the strategic dialogue, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran discounted the "outdated" notions about a coming "conflict of interests" between Beijing and New Delhi. Dismissing the mutual-containment theories about the two, Mr. Saran noted that "the simultaneous emergence of India and China as Asian and global powers in fact makes it imperative for them to be sensitive to each other's interests and aspirations." Now, it can be argued that India's accommodation of China's stand at the EAS was indicative of a certain willingness to be "sensitive" to Beijing's "aspirations" in the regional arena. Without hinting at expectations, if any, of quid pro quo in this context, India has sought its "rightful place in the comity of nations" by raising a critical issue during the strategic dialogue with China. Mr. Saran asked his dialogue-partner and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei for "cooperation from China" in regard to India's bid to secure a "modification in the guidelines" of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). China, like the United States, is a key member of the NSG. India requires the NSG's cooperation to have the freedom of action for producing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. While the NSG's sanctions can be traced to India's arguable defiance of world opinion in testing nuclear weapons in 1998, New Delhi tends to believe that its 2005 "strategic" understanding with the U.S. could help annul the irksome NSG embargoes. Recognising that the U.S. would still have to "take the lead" to help India, Mr. Saran has now tried to bring China on the scene as a new and possible ally among the NSG countries. Authoritative Chinese sources later said India's request for Beijing's cooperation as a designated nuclear supplier "is a sensitive issue, still on the table, for discussion." In any case, Mr. Saran had indicated earlier that he and his Chinese counterpart did not exchange ideas on the specifics of Beijing's current perceptions about the NSG's overall policy towards India. The important point, therefore, is that China and India have now established a degree of mutual confidence that actually enabled New Delhi to press for Beijing's help over the NSG-related dilemma. Noteworthy, too, is Mr. Saran's sense of satisfaction that China has not conveyed to him any unhappiness over the recent India-U.S. nuclear accord. The ongoing strategic dialogue can help refashion the India-China equation. Relevant to this process is the growing perception, behind the diplomatic scenes in East Asia, that China might seek to hasten a settlement of the Taiwan issue sometime after the 2008 Beijing Olympics. New Delhi and Beijing will, therefore, want to be sure that their engagement is not just a matter of each other's strategy for "the management of an emerging power" a substantive idea popularised by China-experts like Alastair Johnston as a critical aspect of Washington's game-plans. A genuine relationship is what India and China need.
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