National

The opportunities and the challenges

The Left may have registered yet another massive victory. But behind this familiar result, lies an interesting story about shifting support bases and voter perceptions, says Yogendra Yadav

On the face of it, the outcome of the Assembly elections in West Bengal is a mere replay of the verdict of the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. In that election, the Left Front secured 50.6 per cent of the vote and led in 223 segments (out of 294), leaving only 35 each for the Trinamool Congress-Bharatiya Janata Party combine and the Congress. The final result this time is very similar. The Left Front has won 50.2 per cent of the votes and 235 seats, leaving 29 seats for the Trinamool and 21 for the Congress.

This fits the standard pattern of a Lok Sabha verdict being replicated in the Assembly elections that follow. Moreover, the staggering victory margin is not unprecedented. The Left Front secured even bigger victories in 1982 and 1987. So, it may appear that the 2006 verdict needs no special explanation. This is the way things are in West Bengal. But such a simple reading misses the true significance of this verdict. If nothing else, the zeal shown by the Election Commission (EC) in monitoring this election lends the result a special meaning.

In political terms, the verdict is as much about change as continuity. This was the first real test of the Left's new leadership, which brought in a new crop of candidates. This was also a test of its ability to retain its social support base in the face of its new economic policies. For the opposition, it was a test of its ability to survive and find a new direction. The popular verdict was expected to shed light on these questions and thus, on the future of politics in the State. Are we any the wiser now?

First, the much-discussed effect of the EC. Clearly, the verdict put paid to the rather naïve and partisan belief that the Left Front owed its extraordinary success to "scientific rigging". The EC did everything it needed to, and a lot it need not have done. On balance, these actions enjoyed popular approval, including from Left Front supporters. The opposition parties hailed this as the fairest election ever. And 58 per cent of the voters, cutting across party lines, said malpractices had come down compared to previous elections (only six per cent thought malpractices had increased). Yet, the Left won an overwhelming majority.

This election may not prove that the ruling front never used unfair means in the last three decades. It may be possible to argue that the Left did gain a few percentage points in the past through means less than fair and that this made a difference in some marginal constituencies. But surely not to the overall outcome. If one maintains this, one will also have to agree that the Left Front has increased its true vote share substantially. The debate on the reasons for the continued dominance of the Left Front now needs to move beyond allegations of rigging and take a closer look at its popular appeal and organisational capacity.

There is one respect in which the EC did make a difference. It ordered revision of the electoral rolls, leading to a large-scale deletion of names. The curious outcome is that in the last five years, the total number of eligible voters has come down by one percentage point rather than go up by six or seven, as one would have expected. The deletions were the maximum in and around Kolkata and in districts bordering Bangladesh. The EC officials would have us believe that the deleted list contained bogus names, included in the rolls to favour the ruling front. Had this been true, the voter turnout would have gone down. But this did not happen except in the Greater Kolkata region. The overall turnout, close to its highest ever, went up by seven percentage points. But the post-poll survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) recorded a fairly normal level of involvement and participation in the elections. It seems that the heavy turnout was the result of the reduction in the electoral rolls. While it is fair to say that the electoral rolls have improved, perhaps by deletion of the names of voters who were temporarily or permanently away, there is little evidence of a large-scale removal of bogus voters.

Divided opposition

If the Left secured about the same votes, in fact a little less than in 2004, how did it manage to secure more seats? The simple answer is the disunity of the opposition. A careful calculation of the Index of Opposition Unity (IOU), a measure of the proportion of non-Left votes that went to the leading non-Left candidate at the constituency level, shows that notwithstanding the wishes of Trinamool leader Mamata Banerjee, the voters were more divided than before. The IOU went down from nearly 80 per cent in 2001 to 76.5.

In other words, even the disastrous alliance in 2001 between the Trinamool and the Congress was better than the Trinamool-BJP alliance this time. The BJP's vote share of less than two per cent is its lowest ever in the State since it made a big entry in 1991. This is not just the result of its contesting a fewer number of seats. The BJP polled substantially less votes per seat contested than the Trinamool. Ms. Banerjee appears to have goofed up on her choice of alliance partner. If the votes of the two Congresses were to be artificially merged, they would have won 103 seats as against their combined tally of just 50 seats. If this verdict represents a dead-end for the opposition, it is not because its overall vote share declined. The real problem is its inability to come up with a credible leadership, a cleverer strategy and an attractive agenda to bring together the non-Left voters.

Shifting social base

This election showed the first signs of a major shift in the support of the Left — from the "old Left" support base (the rural poor and the urban working classes) to the "new Left" support base (comprising the rural well-to-do and the urban middle and upper classes). The popular media perceived this as a shift from the rural to urban voters. The final results do not support such a simple reading. The Left did gain in urban constituencies, especially in the towns outside Greater Kolkata, but its vote share did not decline in rural areas.

We will understand the changing social base better if we divide the urban and rural areas into various social classes. The urban areas showed an overall increase in the Left vote but the most impressive gains came from the professional, salaried classes including all kinds of white-collar workers. In the rural areas, the Left suffered serious losses among agricultural and allied workers, barely maintaining its position among the farmers and tenants. It made massive gains among the rural salaried class.

In short, the Left seems to have contained its losses among its old support base while gaining new social groups. But this move towards a "catch all" party is likely to strain its core constituency in future elections.

There are other changes in the voting pattern. The Left used to enjoy a big advantage among women. That has been significantly reduced. The Left vote, like those of most parties supported by the poor, used to have a pyramid-like shape for different educational groups: wide support among the least educated and narrow support among the highly educated. This profile has given way to a more flat support this time as the Left gained more among the educated and lost some among the illiterate voters.

Similarly, it has gained among upper caste voters, while retaining its support among the Other Backward Classes and the Dalits. The only worrying news for the Left is the loss of more than 10 percentage points among Muslim voters, largely to the Congress. The good news emerges from the analysis of different age groups. The new Left is the favourite of young voters.

Future challenges

This verdict reflects both opportunities and challenges to the Left, especially the dominant CPI(M), which is undergoing a significant change. Its attempt to present itself as a party of continuity as well as change has succeeded. The CPI(M)'s success ratio and its vote share per contested constituency are better than all its partners. Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee enjoys considerable credibility with the voters, though the media may have overplayed his acceptance among the non-Left voters. This strength comes in sharp relief whenever the voters have to compare him with any opposition leader.

The CPI(M)'s decision to change a large number of its candidates also paid off. The Left won 132 of the 154 seats for which it renominated its candidates, a gain of 3 seats over 2001. Among the seats where it changed its candidates, it won 103 out of 139, a net gain of 33 seats as compared to 2001. More importantly, the Left gained more votes in the constituencies where it changed candidates than in those where it retained the old ones. Thus it did manage to appeal to those voters who wanted change. This gives the Left leadership considerable room for policy and politics.

Yet, this victory poses a long-term challenge to the CPI(M). Can it retain its old social base among the rural poor as it moves aggressively to court industrialists and investors? This is particularly important as the Left voters do not seem to be very enthusiastic about the liberalisation agenda, as the CSDS post-poll survey suggests.

The survey also revealed that the people, including the Left supporters, entertained serious reservations about the old style of the CPI(M)'s functioning. Asked about the level of corruption in the party and its interference in the daily life of the people, the overall verdict went against the CPI(M), even among its own supporters. The contradictions and challenges of changing from a working class party to a "catch all" and centre-of-left political formation may not be evident in this hour of celebration. But these questions cannot be postponed for very long.

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