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News Analysis
Amit Baruah
THERE ARE no doomsday scenarios lurking on the India-Pakistan horizon as Foreign Secretaries Shivshankar Menon and Riaz Muhammad Khan sit down to review the state of the bilateral dialogue at Hyderabad House in New Delhi on Tuesday. For India, setting up the counter-terrorism mechanism and seeking Pakistani cooperation on anti-terrorist investigations tops the priority list. For Pakistan, "progress" on Jammu and Kashmir remains important but is not the only issue on the agenda. As the third round of the Foreign Secretary-led composite dialogue comes to an end, some major changes in the regional strategic environment need to be factored into any analysis of the bilateral relations. Afghanistan and the internal battle against Al-Qaeda-Taliban elements inside Pakistan, with the United States breathing down President Pervez Musharraf's neck, is the top priority for Islamabad. India is at number two. India becoming number two in Pakistan's list of priorities is a major development. This strategic preoccupation with tackling Al-Qaeda-Taliban elements within Pakistani boundaries does lead to some softening in Islamabad's dealings with New Delhi. It opens up space to pursue discussions on a range of issues. The India-Pakistan dialogue is no longer hostage to making "progress" on Jammu and Kashmir. In 1997, after the composite dialogue process commenced, Pakistan broke it off within months saying India was not serious about discussing the "core" issue of Jammu and Kashmir. No such danger seems to threaten the composite dialogue today. India broke off links with Pakistan after the December 2001 attack on Parliament before resuming bilateral discussions in the wake of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's ground-breaking trip to Islamabad in January 2004. Again, it was India that postponed Foreign Secretary-level talks, scheduled for end-July 2006, after the carnage on suburban trains in Mumbai. However, this "postponement" did not prevent the Foreign Secretaries from meeting informally on the sidelines of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting in Dhaka on July 31. India, clearly, has pushed the anti-terror agenda to the forefront of the bilateral dialogue. And it goes without saying that India does face a major threat from "jihadi" groups based in Pakistan. Contrary to suggestions from hawks within the Indian strategic community, New Delhi has no option but to engage the Pakistani establishment on counter-terrorism through institutions such as the soon-to-be-created mechanism. Hitting "terrorist" camps in Pakistani-controlled territory is not an option. One would have thought after the tensions of 2002 and the inability of the BJP Government at the Centre to exercise such an option, such ideas would have been given a decent burial. Actually, this counter-terror mechanism flows from the January 6, 2004, "reassurance" by Gen. Musharraf to India that he "will not permit" any territory under Pakistan's control to be "used to support terrorism in any manner." When this correspondent asked National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra on January 6, 2004, whether the General's commitment meant India and Pakistan would now cooperate on counter-terrorism issues, he said the possibility could arise as the two countries continued their dialogue. New Delhi, after presenting evidence of Pakistani "links" to terrorist killings in India, must allow Islamabad space to respond and follow up on the information provided. At the same time, it must maintain diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to investigate leads seriously and substantively. It must also realise that its spokespersons need to discard the habit of blaming the Pakistani state each time an act of terrorism takes place. With the counter-terror mechanism in place, and if India wants results, it would be better to avoid statements such as those a senior Mumbai police official made in the wake of the train blasts. The validity of "evidence" must outlast press conferences and statements police officials make when pressure mounts on them to "show results" after terrorist killings. Rhetoric and point scoring should be eschewed in an effort to try and obtain results through the new mechanism. Much has been accomplished since India and Pakistan ceased firing at each other across the Line of Control and the international border from November 26, 2003. Transport and trade links have been restored and the two countries are diligently engaged in resolving the Baglihar dispute through the good offices of an international expert under the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty. A Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus link is in place. Just recently, the Indian Cabinet approved amendments to the bilateral shipping protocol that will allow for increased shipping links between the two countries, a long-pending demand from business sections. Slowly, but surely, an environment is being created where a resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue could prove possible.
A step backwards
However, Pakistan's decision to go back on the "negative list" of tradable items under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is for India a step backwards for regional integration and shows the contrary pulls and pressure within the establishment in Islamabad. Though some new items have been added to the bilateral positive list for India, Pakistan must implement SAFTA in full. Given that Pakistani officials are used to saying a blunt "no" to India time and again, Islamabad's decision to go back on a done deal is an indication that not everyone there is convinced that trading with India is a good idea. India, of course, must get used to such "two steps forward, one step back" situations. Pursuing peace is not an easy job, but one thing at least is clear: the India-Pakistan dialogue will go on, blips and all.
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