Opinion - News Analysis

Peace in Sri Lanka — putting the pieces together

Ranil Wickremesinghe

The future of a long-term peace hinges on these two agreements — the Ceasefire Agreement and the MOU. If we build on the parameters established by the MOU, the Tokyo Declaration, the six rounds of peace talks, and draw on the Indian model — the final result will be a credible power-sharing proposal that will form the basis for a viable negotiated settlement.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS were held on November 17, 2005. Mahinda Rajapaksa, the People's Freedom Alliance candidate, was elected in the backdrop of an enforced boycott of the elections in the North-East enforced by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The vast majority of Tamils in the North-East were supportive of the United National Party and this enforced boycott was aimed at it. The UPFA electoral platform included amending the Ceasefire Agreement, and a rejection of the federal system. These were demands made by the JVP claiming that (a) the Ceasefire Agreement was a sell out; and (b) a federal system would lead to a separate state.

After the elections, the LTTE started an Intifada type uprising in Jaffna, protesting that the Government was going back on its undertakings. Karuna's paramilitary group re-commenced the killing of LTTE supporters. In retaliation, the LTTE started laying claymore mines and a number of military vehicles were blown up, resulting in a large numbers of deaths.

On December 24, Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil National Alliance MP who supported the LTTE, was killed while praying at his Church in Batticaloa. The TNA and the LTTE alleged that the security forces were involved in the killing. Despite the escalation of violence, the Norwegian Government was able to arrange for talks between the Government and the LTTE in Geneva. The talks were limited to the implementation of the ceasefire.

The ceasefire talks between the two parties were held in Geneva on February 22-23, 2006. Both parties committed themselves to uphold the Ceasefire Agreement. They agreed as follows: "The LTTE is committed to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police. The Government of Sri Lanka is committed to taking all necessary measures in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement to ensure that no armed group or person other than the security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations."

The second round of this phase of talks was set for April 19-21, 2006. Soon after the [first round] talks, the LTTE stated that the Government of Sri Lanka should disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups before the second round of ceasefire talks. The Government of Sri Lanka took no action to disarm the paramilitary, arguing that the Tamil paramilitary forces were operating outside the areas controlled by the Army.

As a result, violence erupted again in March. It escalated after the killing of a prominent leader of the TNA inside the high security zone in Trincomalee. The second round of talks, set for April 2006, was postponed. Since then, seven months of escalating violence have brought a suicide bomb attack on the Army Commander; the explosion of a land mine in Kebettigollawa, resulting in the death of nearly 60 passengers travelling in a bus; sea battles between the Navy and the Sea Tigers; the abduction and killing of Tamil civilians in Colombo District; air strikes within the areas controlled by the LTTE, including the Mullaitivu Hospital; artillery shelling of the Vaharai refugee camp; the Army clearing the LTTE from parts of Trincomalee District; the killing of another very popular TNA Member of Parliament; and the killing of security forces personnel, LTTE members, and Karuna group members.

The Government closed the A9 route in August 2006. Under the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, both parties had agreed to open the A9 route to facilitate the normal transportation of goods and persons; and provision was made for the safety of sea transport between Trincomalee and Jaffna. However, the LTTE has now stated that it cannot assure safe passage for ships passing close to LTTE-controlled areas.

The Co-Chairs have stated that the present situation gives rise to grave concern as the rising level of violence has led to a significant loss of life, widespread human rights violations, and systematic ceasefire violations by both sides. Furthermore, an atmosphere of fear prevails in the land owing to disappearances, killings, and the deliberate targeting of civilians.

Consequently, India and the Co-Chairs have urged the [Sri Lankan] Government to put forward a set of proposals aimed at finding a political solution to the North-East conflict. Thereafter, at the end of August, President Rajapaksa wrote to the UNP and requested our party's assistance to arrive at a political solution to the North-East conflict. Despite the divisive nature of Sri Lankan politics and the climate of acrimony between the party cadres, we responded positively. Talks took place between the two political parties. As a result, on October 23, 2006, the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on key issues vital for the nation's well being.

To me, the success of the recent MOU depends on the ability of both sides and more so between the two of us — the President and myself — to establish a working relationship. This is easier said than done in politics. In a multi-party system where there are two leading parties, the main contenders compete for power, either by themselves or as coalitions. It is very rarely that they work together. Nevertheless, in some countries the main parties have worked together in times of war — usually through coalition governments.

Yet this MOU is not one to form a coalition government. It is an understanding to collaborate — one party being the government and the other party being the main opposition — to prepare a political solution to the North-East conflict.

Elements of the MOU

Under the MOU, a viable resolution of the ethnic issue will be based on the following elements: (i) The eventual solution to the ethnic issue has to be political in character. The cornerstone of the political solution is power-sharing within the country on a basis acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities. (ii) Emphasis will be placed on the principle that power sharing is for the benefit — not of any particular group or party but for the people at large. (iii) The basic assumption underlying an equitable framework for power-sharing is that the central government would be invested with all powers, functions, and responsibilities essential for the effective conduct of national policy, while other matters will fall within the purview of regional administrations. (iv) Priority will be given to prompt and effective action to rehabilitate all persons who have been displaced, or whose lives have been disrupted.

Returning to the peace process, under the Indo-Lanka Agreement [of July 29, 1987] the Northern and Eastern Provinces were combined as one administrative unit. President J.R. Jayewardene issued the relevant gazette notifications under the Provincial Council Act, 1987 merging the two provinces and establishing a Provincial Council. However, on October 16, 2006 this year, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka held that President Jayawardene did not have the authority to issue such gazette notifications, as the LTTE had not surrendered all the arms in accordance with that law. The court further stated that the Parliament could, by legislation, merge the two provinces. The Government is yet to announce its position on the merger of the North and East. This has further complicated matters. And a second round of talks between the Government and the LTTE, held in Geneva on October 28-29, 2006, ended inconclusively.

The Ceasefire Agreement is the main achievement of the 2001 peace initiative. It enabled the commencement of a substantive dialogue through a series of well-structured meetings to discuss both confidence-building measures and a negotiated political solution. The agreements arrived at during the six rounds of peace talks, the statement by the Government of Sri Lanka, and the Oslo and Tokyo Declarations established the parameters of a political solution.

Nevertheless, it has become necessary to review the monitoring mechanism first established under the Ceasefire Agreement. At that time, no one foresaw the present escalation of violence. It has become necessary to make the Monitoring Mission more effective. However, a monitoring mission will succeed only if both parties are committed to upholding the Ceasefire Agreement. While the Ceasefire Agreement still stands, it is observed in the breach by both parties. Neither party is willing to formally abrogate the Agreement.

Speaking at the "Heroes' Day" Commemoration on November 27, 2006, the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, accused the Government of making the Ceasefire Agreement defunct by following what he calls "a war and peace approach." He stated that the LTTE has "no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam." Nonetheless, he has not formerly declared a separate state. Neither has he given notice of termination to the Norwegian Government in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement. However, he has announced that the LTTE is not prepared to "walk along the same futile path" and will re-commence "the freedom struggle."

It is clear then that the LTTE is ready to intensify the war. Its objective is a decisive military victory that will give it a significant advantage at the negotiating table when peace talks resume. The Government has responded by announcing its readiness for war. But no one can control the outcome of escalating violence. Therefore the Co-Chairs and India must determine how to respond to this urgent situation. Otherwise, it will be difficult to get the parties back to negotiations.

In the meeting of June 2004, the Co-Chairs called for a rapid resumption of peace negotiations by the parties. Since then the Co-Chairs have, time and again, taken the initiative to bring the two parties together — going beyond the initial mandate of reviewing the progress in the peace process. Therefore, the role of the Co-Chairs has changed from reviewing progress to holding the peace process together.

Since 1983, India has been helping successive governments of Sri Lanka in their attempt to resolve the North-East conflict. Sri Lanka consulted India before signing the Ceasefire Agreement and, thereafter, has consulted India on many aspects of the peace process. The Government of India also provided inputs pertaining to the technical aspects of the devolution of power. India also has a close dialogue with the Norwegian Government facilitator and the other Co-Chairs. Recently, the Co-Chairs acknowledged that India was working hand-in-hand with them to promote peace in Sri Lanka. Moreover, India has also been instrumental in ensuring that the peace process was continued by the Government of Sri Lanka.

However, both India and the Co-Chairs have pointed out that "the responsibility to make peace lies with the Government and the LTTE. We can be of support to them." On November 21, 2006, the Co-Chairs issued a Joint Statement calling on both the Government and the LTTE to seize the historic opportunity created by the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement to resolve the country's conflict peacefully, and to implement the agreement fully, including the re-opening of the A9 highway.

Co-chairs' stand

Furthermore, the Co-Chairs have urged both parties to commit themselves to a structured and sustained process for further negotiations — without preconditions — once a proposal is available as indicated by the Government and welcomed by the LTTE. The Co-Chairs have also emphasised that (i) the agreement between the SLFP and the UNP should lead to a credible power-sharing proposal that can help form the basis for a viable negotiated settlement between the parties (to the Ceasefire Agreement); and (ii) the specific arrangements for the North and East should not be disturbed as they are fundamental to continuing the dialogue to achieve an agreement.

The future of a long-term peace hinges on these two agreements — the Ceasefire Agreement and the MOU. The implementation of the provisions of the MOU will result in formulating a proposal for a political solution, which will form the base for discussion between the Government and the LTTE. This proposal will re-activate the Ceasefire Agreement leading to simultaneous negotiations on all three tracks of the peace process — the ceasefire, humanitarian relief, and political discussions. The emphasis has now shifted to the MOU as a means of kick-starting the peace process — by putting forward a political solution. This is a radical departure from the step-by-step approach based on the Ceasefire Agreement advocated by us in 2002.

A lot of water has flowed under the bridge in the last five years. The LTTE itself has gained experience in negotiations and acquired knowledge on different systems of government. Time is of the essence, and it is important that the peace process is finalised with the least delay. The Nepalese peace process, which started last year, has already been concluded and the parties have signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Under this approach, the onus is thrown on the two main political parties — the UNP and the SLFP. It is a challenge we must take up. If we fail, the peace process will fail. Therefore, it is imperative that the Committee of Experts (appointed by this Government) conclude their tasks by making their recommendations on the political solution. Their Report should be made available to the All Party Conference by the first week of December. Then, our two parties, the UNP and the SLFP, can commence bilateral discussions based on this Report. If we build on the parameters established by the MOU, the Tokyo Declaration, the six rounds of peace talks, and draw on the Indian model — the final result will be a credible power-sharing proposal that will form the basis for a viable negotiated settlement.

We do not require a UNP solution, an SLFP solution, an LTTE solution, or a JVP solution. We require a Sri Lankan settlement acceptable to all the communities. The other political parties must support our two parties to achieve these objectives.

The Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process are sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances. What is required is the will to make it work. That is provided by the MOU. The fate of the nation depends on us. We cannot and should not fail the people of Sri Lanka.

(Ranil Wickremesinghe, UNP leader, former Prime Minister, and Leader of the Opposition in the Sri Lankan Parliament, is the architect of the 2002 ceasefire. This article is excerpted from a lecture he gave at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore on December 1, 2006.)

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