Date:17/04/2007 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2007/04/17/stories/2007041702571000.htm

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

ULFA and the politics of separatism

M.S. Prabhakara

The United Liberation Front of Asom evokes support as an articulator of Assamese aspirations even from those opposed to its demand for independence.

EVER SINCE the withdrawal of its call to boycott the Guwahati National Games, which earned it some goodwill even outside Assam, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has been steadfast in its two-track approach of suing for talks while reaffirming equally aggressively its unwavering resolve to continue to fight for `Swadhin Asom.' Put simply, this approach has entailed armed action, mostly against vulnerable targets, that continues to catch the authorities unawares while simultaneously pressing for talks with the Government of India on the `core' issue of "restoration of the sovereignty of Assam." Only this, ULFA says, will ensure a peaceful resolution of the "India-Asom political conflict." Further, and as a part of this same process, `civil society forums' continue to press for direct talks without preconditions between the Union Government and ULFA, even as the attacks by the separatists and operations by security forces continue.

In March alone there were 11 incidents, including an ambush of a CRPF patrol party near Dhemaji, attacks on Congress workers in Hajo and Jorhat, and a bomb attack in a busy bazaar area in Guwahati. On March 16, ULFA's `army raising day,' at least three civilians and two militants were killed and scores injured in attacks. There was a lull when five women, all wives of ULFA militants, began a fast unto death on March 21 seeking to know the whereabouts of their spouses `missing' since their capture during the December 2003 Bhutan operation against ULFA and other organisations. Their transfer to Guwahati Medical College Hospital under arrest on March 30 was followed by a grenade attack in a market place in the city on April 3, and the successful enforcement of a 12-hour Assam bandh on April 4.

It is not clear if the increasing stridency on the issue of talks and the threat that future ULFA attacks may well take the form of human bombs are in any way related to the steps being taken by the authorities in Bangladesh against Islamist militants. Indian Intelligence agencies have long held that the Islamists were actually running ULFA and other militant organisations in the region. If that were the case, then ULFA camps and sanctuaries in Bangladesh may soon face the same situation as in Bhutan towards the end of 2003.

Operation All Clear was launched by the Royal Bhutanese Army, with the `logistical support' of the Indian security forces, in December 2003 to clear southern Bhutan of camps of the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO). Several senior ULFA leaders (as well as those belonging to the NDFB and the KLO) were captured and handed over to the Indian Army. The fasting women maintain their husbands were captured by the Bhutanese army on December 18, 2003, and handed over to the Indian Army on December 24, since when they have had no news of them. Altogether 14 ULFA militants are yet to be accounted for though the Government of India has made no such admission. The fast is also inevitably seen as another pressure tactic to force the government to hold talks with ULFA on its terms. For, other demands are the release of five ULFA central committee members to hold consultations on the matter of talks with the Government; and above all, an explicit commitment from the Centre that the agenda of the talks would be `restoration' of Assam's sovereignty.

The Gauhati High Court was petitioned by Shyamali Gogoi, the wife of Ponaram Gogoi one of the `missing' ULFA militants, in January 2005. The High Court directed the defence authorities to submit a list of captured and missing ULFA militants in May last year. This was submitted in June 2006 in a sealed envelope. Almost a year later, the High Court directed the authorities to file further affidavits by April 12 clarifying the apparent discrepancies between the RBA list of persons handed over to the Indian Army and the list submitted to the Court.

On April 12, the Assistant Solicitor General representing the Defence Ministry sought more time from the High Court for filing a further affidavit on the `original list' of captured militants. The problem is that the sealed envelope submitted to the Court in June 2006 did not have the documentation and other details that the RBA authorities had passed on to the Indian Army, which together have come to be known as the `original list.' Thus, the clarification sought by the High Court over the discrepancies. Granting the request, the High Court has fixed May 2 as the final date of hearing.

Before the April 12 deadline itself, ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa had dismissed the High Court's directive as mere `drama' saying `Indian law' could never deliver justice to the people of Assam. He also threatened, articulating ULFA's frustration over the lack of progress in the yet-to-begin-talks, that future attacks may well be `human bombs.' It would be foolish to assume this is an idle threat.

The launching of the fast also coincided with a two-day `national convention' in Guwahati organised by the People's Committee for Peace Initiative (PCPI), which, along with the ULFA appointed People's Consultative Group (PCG), has been active in the matter. The convention concluded with a call for resumption of the peace process without any preconditions, with the issue of `sovereignty of Asom' as the agenda.

The underlying premise

The broad ideological premise underlying the deliberations, in which political parties and organisations from throughout the region participated, was that ULFA's armed struggle for `Swadhin Asom' was a response to the Indian state's colonial attitude. The whole issue, the convention said in a resolution, needed to be resolved `politically.' As always, this `political' approach and perspective was not spelt out. Not all the individuals and organisations demanding talks are supportive of a `Swadhin Asom.' Political parties that accept the Constitution of India and represent the interests of those with pan-Indian and global aspirations are as insistent on the demand for talks as organisations that unambiguously function as the public face of ULFA.

ULFA as an articulator of Assamese `national aspirations' continues to evoke support even though its stated objective of `Swadhin Asom' has few takers. ULFA in this perspective is a tool that can, used properly, do much good. The seeming contradictions of this dynamic are not difficult to understand, if situated in the context of the widespread conviction that `India' continues to be influenced by a colonial mindset in its dealings with Assam and indeed the whole of the Northeast. This perspective, with different shades of emphasis, is shared across the political spectrum, ranging from ultra Indian nationalists to ultra regional nationalists to separatist outfits seeking sovereignty and independence. It reflects the high aspirations and the apprehensions about not attaining them of the new, emergent bourgeoisie in the region.

Precisely because of its pan-Indian and global aspirations, this class though a small player in absolute and even relative terms at the national level is an important and influential player locally. This class is all too aware of the enticing opportunities in `India Inc.' and have indeed spread out into this wider `India.' This they have done even while stoking the fires of legitimate discontent, within the State and the region, of the majority of the people who have not been able to exploit these new opportunities. The successful holding of the National Games and the popular enthusiasm the exercise generated locally reflected both the aspiration to be accepted as an equal participant in `India Inc.' and frustration and fear that this might not come about.