Opinion - Editorials

Taking care of the last lap

With nuclear negotiations between India and the United States entering the final pit stop, it is evident that political intervention from the highest levels is needed to ensure full and complete delivery of the promises Washington made on July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006. Broadly speaking, the U.S. committed itself to adjusting its domestic laws and international commitments to enable full civil nuclear cooperation with India. Implicit in the recognition of India as a country with "advanced nuclear technology" was the assumption that it could not be treated as a non-nuclear weapon state as far as domestic statute or international norms were concerned. The legislative and policy adjustments required had necessarily to be anchored in that reality. It is now clear that the White House never intended fully to meet Indian expectations that flowed from the July 2005 statement. Three waivers to existing legal preconditions for nuclear commerce were incorporated in the Hyde Act passed in December 2006. What was left out, however, was a waiver to the requirement that the U.S. should arm itself with the right to demand the return of any nuclear equipment or material sold to a non-nuclear weapon state in the event of it conducting a nuclear test. Such a requirement is an affront to India's sovereign prerogatives. It is therefore completely unacceptable.

Differences over the `right of return' aside, New Delhi and Washington have not yet been able to reach agreement on several core issues. One cluster of issues includes the right to reprocess spent fuel and import equipment and technology for civilian reprocessing and enrichment. A second cluster concerns fuel assurances and safeguards implementation. The third set revolves round sequencing the next steps as far as the 123 negotiations, the working out of "India-specific safeguards," and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines are concerned. On each of these issues, the U.S. is trying to reopen earlier understandings and commitments. For India, the way ahead is crystal clear. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did well to detail the country's concerns in his statement to the Rajya Sabha in August 2006. Every one of those problems must be resolved if the deal is to be clinched. Any ambiguity about the terms and conditions of nuclear cooperation — especially on the assurance of fuel supplies, reprocessing, safeguards, and the `right of return' — will do immense damage to India's nuclear programme and to national interests. If Washington has come to the determination that it cannot abide by the commitments it made off its own bat, so be it. India will manage to run its nuclear energy programme with or without American cooperation.

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