Opinion - News Analysis

123: Rethink before we go forward

One associates government’s PR or news management with propaganda hand-outs that have low credibility and no impact. However, in the case of the India-U.S. nuclear deal, one must concede that the PR machine has been phenomenally effective. Coverage in the powerful media — the metropolitan newspapers and major TV channels — has been so positive (barring the rare exception) that the government may find it embarrassing. Commentators seem to be outdoing even the party spokesman in praising the government. In this climate of group think and positivity, it may be worth stepping back for a few moments and raising a few critical questions from a wider perspective.

First, the benchmark for judging the agreement: should this not be national interest rather than the Indo-U.S. statement of 2005? Does it provide what we need, which is primarily certain technologies and a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for our civilian power programme, and unfettered freedom to pursue all aspects of our developmental and weapons activities?

The hype about an end to India’s nuclear ostracism is strange. It was by our own volition that we chose many years ago, through different complexions of government and despite pressure, to stay outside discriminatory agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The severe sanctions post our nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 were taken in our stride and our atomic energy programme has continued to progress well. Certainly, these were speed breakers; but the trade-off in terms of degrees of freedom has been worthwhile. Our technological progress and, equally importantly, our growing economy have taken us to the stage where we are in a position to negotiate from a position of some strength. In this context, one certainly feels that what we have got is far too little for what we have given. We have opened up a lucrative market for nuclear reactors, but the equipment and technologies of interest to us — for uranium enrichment and re-processing — will yet not be really available. Even fuel supplies are not guaranteed and our experience with Tarapur, when the U.S. reneged on an international agreement, requires us to create a stockpile. This, and the need to similarly keep an inventory of spares for imported equipment, will unnecessarily add to the cost of power from the nuclear power plants.

While the 123 agreement does open the door to import of civil nuclear equipment (to the obvious delight of U.S. suppliers), this can be taken back at any time. In this context, as expert commentators and U.S. sources have noted, the 123 agreement is, in effect, subservient to U.S. national laws. The Hyde Act has many conditionalities and even seeks to dictate foreign policy. This can be invoked at any time to create serious difficulties for India. While negotiators have clearly made much effort to protect India’s position, the consultation and other processes laid down can work only if there is a strong relationship between the two sides. At any time the relationship sours, everything can be in jeopardy. For example, aside from IAEA inspections — part of the safeguards that we are committing to, in perpetuity — there are end-use conditions that imply U.S. inspections. Irrespective of whether or not this is a slight to our self-respect and sovereignty, such inspections can, in adversarial circumstances, lead to any reports that the sponsor desires, as we know from Iraq, and pave the way for active intervention. As any strategist knows, in international relations there are no permanent friends (the Iraq-U.S. relationship being one case in point).

In any analysis, one looks for motives. In this case, there are two clear U.S. motives, articulated as explicitly as possible by various U.S. sources: the commercial gain from nuclear commerce, and the more important one of containing India’s nuclear weapons programme, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Bringing the breeder reactor programme under international safeguards, pushing India to sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and continuing embargoes on uranium enrichment and re-processing are all part of this strategy. Should this be acceptable to us?

A strong India is the world’s best bet for peace and stability in South, South East, and Central Asia, as also in the Persian Gulf. This volatile region, with some two billion inhabitants, needs a strong secular and democratic power from within the region, to ensure stability and to serve as a counterpoise to transnational fundamentalism as also to China. Neither the U.S. nor Israel can play this role, as they will end up stoking religious fundamentalism as has happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Like the Americans, the Russians too have no cultural affinity or acceptability in most of this region. It is, therefore, in the U.S. interest to not curb the natural growth of India’s military and ‘soft’ power, so that it can play an increasing role in this region. While many of the Bush-Rice pronouncements have indicated an implicit recognition of this — and, therefore, the talk of “helping India become a major power” — the underlying rationale of many of the clauses of the 123 agreement seems to be aimed at emasculating rather than empowering India. Is the U.S. looking for an equal partner in a strategic relationship or a client state? This choice of U.S. policy is for the U.S. to make.

On the other hand, whether to be forever a second-rung country is a matter for India to decide. Today, countries that face no perceptible military threat feel the need to retain, grow, and modernise their nuclear capabilities (France and the United Kingdom). India, with two nuclear powers on its borders should have at least the same degree of freedom in pursuing its nuclear efforts. This will require enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and may require testing to prove and perfect weapons. Apart from severe constraints on dual-use technologies, the 123 agreement creates a separation between civil and military facilities, doing away with the ambiguity, cost, and facility-sharing that has been an essential part of the programme.

Arguments have been advanced about this being a purely civilian deal with no impact on India’s strategic programme; about how this will help reduce global warming by cutting down on fossil fuels; and even about the role this agreement will play in helping meet India’s energy needs. These hardly deserve rebuttal. For long years, nuclear power will form but a small part of India’s energy production and the incremental gain of importing reactors as against the slower indigenous approach will be little more than marginal. In terms of dependence, supplies of imported coal or hydro-carbons are far more reliable and offer more alternative sources than nuclear fuel. Moving the nuclear energy cycle to thorium as quickly as possible will vastly reduce our dependence on imports, since thorium is plentifully available in India. This, however, requires a strong R&D effort. Demotivating India’s scientific community through a deal that has little support amongst them is not the best way to go about this.

Some of these issues need serious debate, without casting the kind of aspersions that unnamed government sources have been indulging in. The Prime Minister set an outstanding example by having one discussion with some experts who are no longer in government. However, one does not know if their views have subsequently been sought. The strategic and scientific community needs to be heard with respect, especially those experts who are free to speak their mind. An informed public debate is essential on an issue of such tremendous import to the very future of this country.

(The author has had a long association with India’s technology establishment, and prefers a discussion of the issues here rather than his identity.)

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