Date:11/08/2007 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2007/08/11/stories/2007081156181300.htm

Opinion - News Analysis

“It is a practical solution that meets all our requirements”

T.S. Subramanian

Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, says the ‘123’ agreement between India and the United States on nuclear cooperation “is a practical way forward. So it is satisfactory.” In an interview toThe Hinduin Mumbai on August 6, he clarified that the agreement provides for a possibility of transfer of reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water technologies but it would require an amendment. Excerpts:

— Photo: N. Sridharan

Anil Kakodkar: “The unilateral voluntary moratorium [on testing] we have, remains as such. There is no conversion of that into a bilateral legality.”

What compelled the Department of Atomic Energy to go in for this ‘123’ agreement with the United States when it is on course with its indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme? Where is the need to import light water reactors (LWRs)?

The fundamental priority remains the development of the three-stage nuclear power programme. Even in the programme of 20,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2020, which provides for PHWRs [pressurised heavy water reactors], a number of FBRs [fast breeder reactors] and an AHWR [advanced heavy water reactors] run on thorium, there was a provision for eight imported LWRs of 1,000 MWe each. The objective is that while we open up the huge energy potential in our thorium resources through the development of our three-stage programme, we also look for additionalities in the near-term through imports.

Similarly, if the civil nuclear cooperation comes about and we are able to import natural uranium, we can also set up more indigenous PHWRs. So this international civil nuclear cooperation is to get additional nuclear power generation capacity in the near term, without in any way affecting our three-stage programme or the strategic programme or our domestic R&D activities.

We should also look at it from the point of view of possibility of exports. For example, our PHWRs are the smallest, commercially competitive systems worldwide. It may be of interest to several developing countries … Once the international civil nuclear cooperation opens up, it should be possible for us to sell our reactors and technology to other countries … who may have an interest in them just as it should be possible for us to buy reactors from other countries... The embargoes are there at present. If the restrictive regime which is operating around us goes away, it is certainly good for a greater share of nuclear power in the total power generation capacity.

What are the areas in the 123 agreement that have satisfied you? What are the areas with which you are disappointed?

I have always viewed the possibility of opening the civil nuclear cooperation as an additionality. These additions will not in any way impinge on our domestic development of the three-stage nuclear power programme, our strategic programme, and our R&D. Secondly, if we set up nuclear power stations which are acquired from outside, then there should be an assurance that there will be no interruption in their operation. With whatever spent fuel that will arise in these power stations, it should be possible to reprocess and recycle [plutonium] so that we can get the benefit of 50 to 60 times more energy. Also, there should be no difficulties in terms of spent fuel management in accordance with our domestic policy of reprocessing and recycling in a closed fuel cycle mode. This agreement provides for all this. These are our requirements and they are met … This agreement is a practical solution, which meets all our requirements. It is a practical way forward. So it is satisfactory.

There are three central issues: India’s right to reprocess the spent fuel into plutonium from the reactors to be imported; uninterrupted fuel supply for these imported reactors; and India’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which it does not want to convert into a bilateral legality with the U.S. Are you satisfied in all these areas?

I think so. There is an upfront reprocessing consent right. There is an assurance of uninterrupted operation of reactors. In terms of tests, the unilateral voluntary moratorium we have remains as such. There is no conversion of that into a bilateral legality. So I think it is satisfactory.

The U.S. has only given its consent to make a request to it to allow us to reprocess the spent fuel from the imported reactors. The consent may come after a year and a half. How can you say upfront consent has been given?

This needs to be clarified. First, that there is a consent for reprocessing is very explicitly stated in the same Article [6(iii)] in the beginning: “the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement.” So this consent right is upfront. There is no ambiguity about it. Now the important point to recognise is that you need to establish arrangements and procedures with regard to safeguards, physical protection, storage and environment, and such other parameters. The agreement spells out the standards for these purposes.

Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures, and consultation for this purpose will start in six months from the date of the request and it will be completed in one year. So it is not one year and a half. It is one year from the date of the request that arrangements and procedures will be in place.

“Arrangements and procedures” seem to be a loaded term. Can the U.S. not impose any number of conditions under that, and delay granting India the reprocessing rights?

No, no. For what does the Agreement talk about “arrangements and procedures”? It says, “These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with regard to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilised in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.”

So these arrangements and procedures have been clearly spelt out, and also the standards to be adopted are spelt out. There is no ambiguity about that.

The Agreement says that India should build “a new, national facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.” Supposing the U.S. insists that we should show them the design of this reprocessing plant and picks holes in it?

When you sign up safeguard arrangements with the IAEA, certain information has to be defined but it is to the extent of safeguardability. It is not necessary that every information has to be given. Only information about safeguardability has to be given because we must satisfy that safeguards can be satisfactorily put in place. All these with respect to the IAEA. There is no issue on that. We have done that in the past.

Reprocessing is at the heart of India’s three-stage programme. Is there a diabolical game to block India from going ahead with its second and third stages and saddle it with imported reactors?

We should go by what is stated in the Agreement. It clearly states that upfront consent rights [for reprocessing are granted]. There is a clear provision for completing the arrangements and procedures within one year from the date of the request and we can make that request the day the Agreement is in place. Afterwards, you can build the facility, get IAEA safeguards established and carry on with reprocessing. That is an activity between us and the IAEA.

Over and above that, the agreement has a non-hindrance clause, which says that there cannot be any hindrance or interference in India’s unsafeguarded programme or programmes involving military nuclear facilities and so on. So there is an explicit statement in the agreement itself — a legal provision that we can carry on our programme unhindered, according to our policies. Similarly, we can carry on with the reactors which are supplied to us under this agreement. We can reprocess the fuel supplied under this agreement and we can re-use the plutonium, derived after reprocessing the spent fuel, in safeguarded national facilities. So it is quite clear.

The four FBRs that India will build before 2020 will not be under safeguards. After these four, whatever FBRs India builds, it can determine which will come under safeguards and which will not.

Yes. It is for India to decide. Where we are using fuel derived from the spent fuel of imported origin, we will put them under IAEA safeguards.

This agreement seems to be full of verbal jugglery. For instance, in Article 5 (2), it says, “Transfers of dual-use that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and licence policies.” So it is clear that the Hyde Act, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, its Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 will apply to this agreement, and all these three deny reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water production technologies to India. Does it mean that India will not get full, civil nuclear cooperation from the agreement although it promises that?

Let us look at it the following way. As I said earlier, we are talking about our ability to derive full benefit out of imported fuel, using our ability to reprocess and recycle the nuclear material and derive 50 to 60 times more energy potential compared to what is possible in once-through use. This is one part. With regard to reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water technologies, the U.S. has not transferred these technologies to any country so far. So this agreement provides for a possibility of such transfers but that will require an amendment to this agreement. That possibility has been kept open.

With regard to dual-use items for use in heavy water, reprocessing and enrichment facilities, one should remember that these items do not involve sensitive nuclear technology. The agreement says that they can be transferred consistent with the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations, and licence policies. That provision has been made.

What do you mean by this?

In the sense, there is a positive forward-looking provision on transfers. It prevents an outlook of targeting these facilities. The point is we are able to carry forward our activities including reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water [production]. We are able to derive full benefits from international civil nuclear cooperation. So it is a satisfactory arrangement… In fact, it talks about full civil nuclear cooperation, reactors, fuel and aspects of associated nuclear fuel cycle. So it is a broad-based Agreement that covers all aspects of nuclear cooperation. Wherever we proceed with this cooperation, there is no possibility of any interruption. At the same time, there is a non-hindrance protection to our domestic activities.

The same Article 5 (2) says, “Sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement.” Does it mean that it will attract a review by the U.S. Congress?

I think perhaps yes. But that is in future when the two countries decide to cooperate further in transfers in these areas — sensitive nuclear technologies that will require an amendment to this agreement … The important point to recognise is that the agreement does not say that they will not be transferred. They have kept an opening for the future.

So there is full civil nuclear cooperation?

I think so.

There is a cloud of uncertainty even about the uninterrupted fuel supply for the reactors to be imported. Article 5 (6) (b) (i) says, “The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India Agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.” Does it mean it requires the Congress’ ratification?

The whole document will go to the U.S. Congress. This entire thing [agreement] is a cut and paste of the March Separation Plan. It is entirely identical. And the U.S. is making a commitment that it will get this done. They will have their arrangements and they will join with other countries and they [other countries] will support building a strategic reserve of fuel [for India] to guard against any interruption. There are these multi-layered assurances including that if there is a disruption of fuel supply, India will have the right to take corrective measures. There is a good amount of protection. The agreement says that it will provide “for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign supplies.” So uninterrupted operation of the reactors is assured in the agreement.

The agreement says, “If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and the recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.” Isn’t this a backdoor entry for the American inspectors to our safeguarded facilities?

No. Not at all. It is very unambiguous. First of all, the agreement talks only about IAEA safeguards. The determination on application of safeguards rests only with the IAEA. Even if it comes to a situation where the IAEA determines that the application of safeguards is not possible, which is almost an impossibility — even if the IAEA were to determine that — what is there in the agreement is that there will be consultation between the supplier and the recipient on verification measures. Verification measures are not the same as safeguards … Verification means you basically verify that the material that is supposed to be there is there. You are assured that there is no diversion.

The Americans can terminate the Agreement before its expiry period of 40 years by giving us notice.

We can also terminate ... The whole agreement is balanced on both the sides.

If the Americans terminate the Agreement before the end of 40 years, will the imported reactors, however, continue to be under safeguards in perpetuity? Isn’t it an imbalance?

Our ability to continuously run the reactors is also ensured. If the agreement is terminated, we can still run the systems using the strategic reserve of fuel. Only no new reactors will come.

Supposing India conducts a nuclear explosion and the U.S. terminates the Agreement and wants to take back the reactor vault, steam generators, coolant channels, etc. Is it possible to take back to the U.S. all these equipment, which will be full of radiation?

It is practically not possible. Even if they do, they have to pay for it. We can use that money to set up other systems.

Will the reactors to be imported be turn-key or will the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) build them after importing the equipment like it is doing with the Russian reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu now?

That depends on the contract for the reactors.

In sum, do you feel that this Agreement is in consonance with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement by Dr. Manmohan Singh and the U.S. President George W. Bush and the Separation Plan?

I think so… I already said this is a satisfactory arrangement.