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U.S. ramps up confrontation with Iran

In the nuclear chess game Tehran has been playing with Washington, it somehow manages to keep a couple of moves ahead of the American side. But Persians have a birthright over the game of chess.

The latest phase of the Iran-U.S. standoff repeats the story. There is a growing sense of frustration in Washington that Iran has made it very hard for the U.S. to secure unanimous support for another sanctions resolution against it in the United Nati ons.

Much of the recent anti-Iran rhetoric on the part of Washington could well turn out to be pure political theatre. But danger lurks. Against the backdrop of the bloody disaster in Iraq (and a potential one in Afghanistan), there is a pressing need for Washington to build up an alternative story of political success in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The probability exists, therefore, that the George W. Bush administration might decide at some point to shake up Iran’s chessboard.

The U.S. resorted to its strongest public language on Iran when President Bush, while addressing the American Legion, charged that Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology put the Middle East “under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.” He alleged that Iran is aiding and abetting Shia militia forces in Iraq that are causing U.S. deaths. Ominously, he revealed that he had ordered the U.S. commanders in Iraq to “confront Tehran’s murderous activities.”

Meanwhile, reports appeared that Pentagon had drawn up plans for a massive air strike against 1200 targets in Iran, and that the U.S. plans were no more restricted to “pinprick strikes” against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but they aimed at taking out the entire Iranian military.

Tehran has taken the U.S. rhetoric seriously. Its response came from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the head of the Expediency Council and Experts Assembly, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, signalling that Washington should not misjudge the Iranian resolve to resist. Mr. Khamenei described Mr. Bush’s remarks as “arrogant, lawless and hateful,” and reminded Washington that the U.S.’ “arrogance and reliance on [military] power has got them bogged down in quagmires time and again, hastening their ultimate collapse.” Mr. Rafsanjani warned that Iran would teach the U.S. “a lesson better than the one the Americans got in Vietnam.”

Leaving aside rhetoric, what are Washington’s compulsions for a muscular intervention in Iran? An answer lies in the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran, made public on August 30. The report mentions that following the latest round of negotiations in Tehran, a “significant step” has been taken in the nature of a timetable mutually agreed upon for resolving the outstanding issues by November. The report notes with satisfaction, “If Iran finally addresses the long-standing verification issues, the Agency should be in a position to reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

The report details that Iran has begun clarifying its nuclear activities. Thus, it says, Iran has satisfactorily addressed the plutonium-related concerns. Secondly, the timetable visualises that the two sides will address the remaining issues sequentially: Iran will explain the use of the advanced centrifuge machine that is in the R&D stage; the circumstances of the contamination of equipment in the Tehran University; the reason for possessing a uranium metal design document and its experimentation with basic Plutonium 210; and, thereupon, Iran will furnish the details of its uranium mine near Bandar Abbas, and finally, it will explain the contents of a “laptop” that was handed over to the U.S. by an Iranian defector.

It might seem incredible that there could be such a plain, unemotional narrative of the contents of the infamous Iran nuclear file. Clearly, after assigning a staggering 219 inspectors to Iran, under immense American pressure, IAEA refuses to concur with the U.S. allegations regarding any plutonium-reprocessing activities by Iran. The IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, stressed this during a press conference. He said IAEA inspectors had uncovered little so far to back up charges that Iran had developed a military nuclear capability. “We have not seen any weaponisation of their [Iranian] programme, nor have we received any information to that effect — no smoking gun or information from intelligence,” Mr. ElBaradei said.

He added: “I hear war drums that are basically saying that the solution is to bomb Iran. It makes me shudder because some of the rhetoric is a reminder of the run-up to the Iraq war.” Unsurprisingly, the latest IAEA report comes as a huge setback to Washington’s case seeking further U.N. sanctions against Iran. In recent speeches, therefore, Mr. Bush has shifted the focus to Iran’s influence in Iraq, and has linked it with its ambitions as a nuclear and regional power.

The U.S.’ definition of the “Iranian threat” is evolving. The Bush administration has hinted that it is on the verge of declaring Iran’s 120000-strong Revolutionary Guards, and its operational arm known as the Quds Brigade, as a “terrorist” group. That would be a step away from making Iran itself a potential target for U.S. military action, since the Iranian state would be officially designated as harbouring terrorists.

In his speech to the American Legion, Mr. Bush harped on Iran’s role in Iraq. He said, “Shia extremists, backed by Iran, are training Iraqis to carry out attacks on our forces and the Iraqi people. Members of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards are supplying extremist groups with funding and weapons … And with the assistance of Hizballah, they’ve provided training for these violent forces inside of Iraq”. Mr. Bush warned, “America doesn’t give in to thugs and assassins. And America will not abandon Iraq in its hour of need.”

But the whole world knows by now that the attacks on the U.S. forces in Iraq are by the Sunni resistance, and not by the Iraqi Shia militia — and that Sunni fighters in Iraq enjoy the support of countries that are allies of the U.S. in the region.

As was evident in Karbala on August 26, violence emanates out of the power struggle amongst the Shia groups. The Mahdi Army loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is vying for power in Southern Iraq (from where Britain is vacating) with the Badr Brigade of the Islamic Supreme Council led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council affiliated to the Shia high cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. At stake is the control over the fabulous oil wealth of Southern Iraq and the two holy sites of Najaf and Karbala, which are crucial sources of political invalidation.

Equally, Mahdi Army, though supported by Iran, unfailingly evokes Iraqi national sentiment. Badr Brigade, though openly pro-Iran, coordinates most of its work with the U.S. military and is in reality a “dual ally” of the U.S. and Iran. As for Ayatollah al-Sistani, no one can dispute that he has a mind of his own.

Besides, the hiatus between the Shia groups is also an extension of the theological contention between the Hawza followers of Ayatollah al-Sistani and followers of late Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father, who was murdered by Saddam Hussein. In other words, Americans are watching an unfolding 3-way Shia power struggle, in which Iran lacks the will or the capacity to intervene.

So what is the upshot of Mr. Bush’s elaborately staged sound byte regarding Iran’s nexus with militant Iraqi Shia militia? The short answer is, pressure is mounting on the Bush administration as a key U.S. progress report is awaited on Iraq. The original goals of the “surge” strategy — promoting Iraqi political action and national reconciliation — haven’t been met. A war-weary U.S. public and mutinous Congress are seeking a good enough reason why this senseless war must roll on.

The Bush administration finds it expedient to associate the “surge” with more easily and widely accepted U.S. national interests. As the director of international security and defence policy at the Rand Corporation, James Dobbins, put it: “The [Bush] administration is tailoring its arguments to those most likely to achieve resonance with the American public, and focussing on Al-Qaeda and Iran strikes a responsive chord in the country that transcends the Republican base.”

The paradox is, demonising Iran may hold appeal in terms of American attitudes — and may even wrong-foot adversaries in a tough election year — but it is contradictory to stabilising Iraq. To quote Mr. Dobbins, “The dilemma for the U.S. will be either we focus on stabilising Iraq, or we try to contain Iran. But it can’t be both.” (Mr. Dobbins negotiated Iran’s tacit backing of the U.S-led overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001.)

Indeed, all this leaves the international community in the middle, twisting and turning. It remains troublingly unclear how Mr. Bush would ultimately reconcile his apocalyptic vision of nuclear holocaust in the Middle East.

But one thing remains clear: Mr. Bush intends to continue with his current approach to Iraq until the end of his term. The challenge for the international community would be to keep anticipating a policy shift in Washington’s 30-year enmity with Tehran, but without having to go along with any U.S. initiative.

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