Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Explaining the non-deal with Russia

Why did the Indian government back away — a few days before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Moscow for a summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin — from signing an intergovernmental nuclear agreement with Russia that had been negotiated in detail? Posing this question in Wednesday’s parliamentary debate in the context of an editorial published by The Hindu on the Moscow visit, Leader of the Opposition Lal Krishna Advani asked the government to “come clean on this matter.” Left leaders had raised the same question in the last meeting of the UPA-Left committee on the India-U.S. nuclear deal; and CPI (M) general secretary Prakash Karat had posed it in an interview to NDTV.

The original report from which the question sprang (“India fails to sign deal for more reactors for Koodankulam,” published in The Hindu of November 13, 2007) was from our insightful Russia Correspondent, Vladimir Radyuhin. He quoted “an informed [Russian] source” as saying that an intergovernmental agreement in pursuance of the January 2007 MoI had been fully prepared for signature during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit for the summit but “the Indian side, at the last minute, decided not to sign it, even as we were ready to go ahead with it. This came as a big surprise to us.”

After all, Russia is the only member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that is currently involved in civilian nuclear cooperation with India. In November 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev signed an intergovernmental agreement for the supply of two 1000 MWe light-water reactors by the Soviet Union to India. Under this turn-key agreement, Atomenergoeksport would build the reactors at an extensive site at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu; the Soviet Union would supply the low enriched uranium (LEU) for the lifetime of the reactors; and Soviet credit would finance the project.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, a final contract for the reactors had not been signed. It seemed the deal had collapsed because of the presumed inability of Russia to provide capital for the project. But within a couple of years negotiations over the Koodankulam reactors were resumed, under more congenial circumstances. Disagreements over financing and credit were resolved in prolonged negotiations. The final agreement was signed on June 21, 1998. Russia would supply designs and equipment for the building of two 1000 MWe VVER light-water reactors at Koodankulam at a cost of Rs. 13,000 crore; and the project would be financed by Russian credits. In turn, India would accept facility-specific IAEA safeguards in perpetuity. Everything, including the mutual obligations, was precisely set down; and there was no uncertainty at all over issues such as what would happen if India were to conduct nuclear explosive tests.

Significantly, this deal was clinched by the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government in the weeks following Pokhran-II. Especially because it had survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and India’s emergence on the world stage as a self-declared nuclear weapon state, the Koodankulam agreement was widely seen as politically important. For India, it strongly established Russia’s reliability as a civilian nuclear supplier that would do its best for India even under adverse circumstances.

Not surprisingly, the United States raised legal objections to the agreement when it was being negotiated. Under the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992, non-nuclear-weapon states must agree to full-scope IAEA safeguards to qualify to receive sensitive nuclear material. However, the requirement of full-scope safeguards would not apply to agreements drawn up before April 1992. Russia took the stand that, since the original intergovernmental agreement for two reactors at Koodankulam was signed in 1988, the supply of these two reactors and the fuel for them would not be subject to the 1992 NSG requirement of full-scope safeguards. Instead there would be facility-specific safeguards. The first 1000 MWe Koodankulam reactor is scheduled to reach criticality in December 2008, and the second six months later.

A Memorandum of Intent (MoI) was signed by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government in January 2007 during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India. A little-noticed detail is that apart from four more 1000 MWe reactors at Koodankulam, this envisages “the construction of Russian design nuclear power plants at new sites in the Republic of India” (emphasis added). In addition, a Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of India and the President of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy was adopted during President Putin’s visit.

Mr. Putin was asked a pointed question during an interview he gave to Doordarshan and PTI on the eve of his India visit: did he think the nuclear agreement under negotiation between India and the U.S. was “an obstacle to developing further cooperation” between India and Russia? His answer is eminently worth recall: “We do not look at how India develops her relations with other countries, including in the nuclear sphere. Our cooperation with India rests on a bilateral basis. We certainly respect the principles of non-proliferation and our obligations contained in international treaties, and we think and assume that our other partners will do the same. We take our own decisions, in agreement with our Indian friends, on what to do or not to do, I repeat, while observing our international observations” (emphasis added).

Seven months later, the text of the 123 agreement between the United States and India (Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy) was released. Even after that, the clear understanding was that Russia and India would conclude an intergovernmental agreement, as envisaged by the MoI. This was reported in the Indian press. For example, on October 14, 2007, The Hindu published a report (“India, Russia to sign nuclear energy pact”) by Vladimir Radyuhin. He quoted Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov as saying that a comprehensive [intergovernmental] agreement would be signed providing for the construction of four additional 1000 MWe nuclear power units at Koodankulam and laying down guidelines for long-term cooperation in nuclear energy.

This statement was made during External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Moscow to co-chair the 13th meeting of the Indo-Russian intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation. Mr. Mukherjee himself was quoted in the report as voicing confidence that the nuclear energy collaboration would be expanded. There were also other media reports that an intergovernmental nuclear agreement would be signed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Russia.

A key question was whether the four additional Koodankulam reactors could be ‘grandfathered’ by the 1988 intergovernmental agreement between Russia and India. Both sides understood the answer to be: ‘almost certainly not.’ But there is no evidence to suggest that the Indian side explored this route seriously.

What is clear now is that following External Affairs Minister Mukherjee’s visit to Moscow in October 2007, the mutual understanding was to sign an intergovernmental agreement for the four additional Koodankulam reactors and also for long-term civilian nuclear cooperation. As mentioned earlier, our Russia Correspondent revealed this in his exclusive story (“India fails to sign deal for more reactors for Koodankulam”) published in The Hindu of November 13, 2007. His privileged Russian source also confirmed that it was not possible to grandfather the four-reactor deal under the original 1988 agreement. Interestingly, the source also suggested that New Delhi decided to defer this agreement with Russia because of India’s problems with the 123 agreement with the U.S.

In normal course, the Government of India should have gone ahead, as planned, and signed the intergovernmental agreement with Russia that was ready, or virtually ready, for signature. Operationalising the agreement would be contingent on negotiating (a) appropriate IAEA safeguards and (b) obtaining exemption for India from the existing NSG guidelines.

But Prime Minister Manmohan Singh — who is known to be deeply upset over the blocking of the operationalisation of the 123 agreement — turned down an opportunity to be even-handed by concluding an intergovernmental agreement that would at least be on a par with the U.S.-India 123. Asked why (during an interaction with journalists en route to the India-ASEAN Summit in Singapore), he explained: “Since there has been some hitch in finalising the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and we are yet to go to the NSG, it was felt that it will be premature to sign an agreement which we cannot operationalise.” He confirmed that “it has been made known to us” that the operationalisation of an India-Russia intergovernmental agreement for four additional reactors was contingent on meeting the two conditions.

What Dr. Singh failed to explain was why, on the eve of an important visit and after his government had virtually tied up the four-reactor deal, he rejected what would have seemed to political India and the world a more even-handed approach to civil nuclear cooperation. It is common knowledge that an intergovernmental agreement with Russia would be much less restrictive than the 123 read along with the Hyde Act. For one thing, the Koodankulam model is based on absolutely guaranteed fuel supply for the life of the reactors as the quid pro quo for India accepting facility-specific safeguards in perpetuity. Russia does not have restrictive domestic laws such as the Atomic Energy Act and Hyde Act of the U.S. Signing the intergovernmental agreement would surely have strengthened India’s hand in seeking international civilian nuclear cooperation and defeating attempts to impose irksome extraneous conditions.

Is there a linkage between the stalling of the new Russia-India intergovernmental agreement and the beleaguered status of the 123? The answer, from a plain reading of the facts, is ‘yes, because there is no other credible explanation.’ Is there a linkage between backing away, just before the Prime Minister’s Russia visit, from signing the intergovernmental agreement and an apprehension of American displeasure? A reasonable inference from a reading of the facts is ‘yes.’ If this is not the case, the government should indeed come clean on why it did not sign the intergovernmental agreement with Russia — after giving the impression that it was about to do so. In other words, it needs to demonstrate that it is not a one-trick pony in the international nuclear arena.

© Copyright 2000 - 2009 The Hindu