Opinion - Editorials

Post-Vienna scenario

By lifting a 16-year-ban on nuclear commerce with India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has wisely abandoned a policy that made no sense from the non-proliferation, commercial, or environmental point of view. Full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply might have had a certain relevance to the NSG in the 1990s as an instrument to push holdouts into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, the only holdouts are India, Pakistan, and Israel. While proliferation cons iderations are still a factor as far as Islamabad and Tel Aviv are concerned, India’s creditable record of export control, its political and strategic responsibility, and the sheer size of its economy and long-term energy needs put it in a separate class altogether. The waiver approved by the 45-nation group strikes a balance between political India’s desire to safeguard the independence and autonomy of strategic decision-making and the apprehension of some NSG members that their decision might encourage India to deviate from its repeatedly stated non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. The decision makes it clear that the NSG considers these commitments to be the basis for exempting India from the requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports. Equally, there is no automatic withdrawal of the exemption in the event that one or more members accuse India of deviation. Terminating nuclear supplies will require the consent of all 45 members. The principle of consensus, which worked against the country all these years, will now be a factor in its favour — unless of course high-pressure politics intervenes to neutralise this factor of advantage.

The NSG’s decision is a significant achievement for Indian diplomacy, especially since the United States, which moved the proposal and was responsible for piloting it through, tried its hardest to introduce extraneous conditions. The government will claim that for the first time in many years India has succeeded in moving the international system in a way that enlarges the country’s economic and strategic options. But having multiple options in a legal and technical sense provides no guarantee that political choices will be made wisely and independently — and not under external pressure. Post-Vienna, there is one immediate and one long-term challenge Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must squarely face up to. He must immediately make it clear to the Bush administration that India will not be able to proceed with bilateral nuclear cooperation with the U.S., if Washington seeks to implement the deal in the undermining way indicated in the State Department’s official response to Congressional questions. Billions of dollars cannot be spent on American nuclear facilities if there is going to be any uncertainty surrounding future fuel supplies and reprocessing consent rights. The long-term challenge is one of managing the politics of the NSG itself. India needs to enlarge its field of partners, creating a web of commercial and technological linkages with as many NSG members as possible. The waiver opens up possibilities for mutual benefit with many countries — starting with Russia, India’s most reliable nuclear supplier, and France — across the full spectrum of the nuclear fuel circle. All political eyes will be on the United Progressive Alliance government’s approach to post-Vienna opportunities, for example on how quickly it moves to operationalise the next, significantly expanded stage of civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia at Koodankulam.

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