National

More Koodankulam units only if Russia amends law

New Delhi: One of the agreements signed between India and Russia during the visit of the former Russian President, Vladmir Putin, in January 2007 was a Memorandum of Intent (MoI) to add four more nuclear power units at Koodankulam, where Russia is already constructing two units.

The MoI also expressed the Russian interest to build an unspecified number of plants at other sites as well. However, a formal signing of an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) to implement these intentions is yet to be done, which is expected to happen during President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit in December this year.

But the IGA can be realised only if Russia amends a domestic law that restricts nuclear exports to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs). This amendment is likely to be brought about before President Medvedev undertakes his visit to India, according to reliable sources.

The former President, Boris Yeltsin, issued Decree No. 312 on March 27, 1992 — which was later made law on December 21, 1992 — which states: “Export from Russian Federation of nuclear materials, as also technologies, equipment, installations and special non-nuclear materials, meant for their processing, use or production, at any state, which does not have a nuclear weapon, may be realised only under the condition of setting up of all nuclear activity of this state with the guarantee (safeguards) of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).”

The above implies that export of nuclear Trigger List items — equipment and materials directly related to nuclear fuel cycle — requires the recipient state to have implemented Full-Scope Safeguards (FSS) in its nuclear activities. Interestingly, the Russian regulation actually precedes the Warsaw amendments to the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that brought in the requirement of FSS for transfer of the Trigger List goods, which were adopted only in April 1992.

Though Russia, being in the process of building two units at Koodankulam, can be the first to get off the block in the wake of the recent amendment to the NSG Guidelines that waives the requirement of FSS specifically for India, the above law of 1992 must be amended and brought in line with the amended NSG Guidelines before it can revive nuclear commerce with India.

The Russian law, as originally adopted in 1992, was actually stricter than the Warsaw Guidelines. It did not have the provisions for exemption from FSS under two exceptional circumstances that the NSG Guidelines had. These related to (1) transfers pertaining to pre-April 1992 agreements and contracts — the provision of “grandfather clause;” and, (2) transfers required for safety of nuclear plants. Such exceptional transfers could be done with islanded or facility-specific safeguards alone as against FSS.

In the original form of the law, Russia could, therefore, not have implemented the 1988 agreement for the two Koodankulam reactors, which the NSG Guidelines actually allowed. The necessary amendment came in the form of a Government Regulation No. 574 on May 8, 1996, after Russia sent a note verbale to the IAEA stating its adherence to the NSG Guidelines. Strangely enough, the amendment still did not incorporate the second of the exceptional circumstances, namely transfers for safety reasons.

This amendment to the law came only on May 7, 2000 through an Edict No. 822 issued by President Putin. It is only after this amendment, Russia could export uranium fuel for the Tarapur reactors in 2001 (and more recently in 2006) under the safety exception provision. It could not have done so in 1995 when the nuclear fuel supplied by France (under the 30-year Indo-American agreement of 1963) had run out. France could not continue supplies because of the requirement of FSS under the NSG Guidelines. India had to turn to China, then not an NSG member, which made a one-time supply in 1995.

Thus, as observers point out, Russia must get its legal framework in order and amend its 1992 law suitably if it has to take advantage of its better positioning in the Indian context and be the first to begin nuclear exports. Though details of French domestic laws are not readily available, it stands to reason that France too must have nuclear export laws that are in conformity with the NSG Guidelines. If so, France will also have to amend its laws to incorporate NSG’s India-specific waiver. It is not clear if this has already been done.

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